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FOREWORD 
This technical note documents experience gained in the area of spacecraft crew 
station design and operations during the Apollo Program. Emphasis is given to the 
t ime period ranging f rom ear ly  1964 up to, and including, the Apollo 11 lunar-landing 
mission of July 1969 - an era that covers three important phases of the Apollo Pro- 
gram: the design phase, hardware construction, and mission operations. 
This technical note consists of five volumes. Volume I, "Crew Station Design 
and Development, ' I  gives an overview of the total crew station integration task. Vol- 
umes 11, 111, IV, and V a r e  specialized volumes, each of which is devoted to a basic 
functional area within the Apollo crew station. The subject of each volume is indi- 
cated by its title, as follows. 
Volume 11, "Crew Station Displays and Controls, " NASA TN D-7919 
Volume 111, "Spacecraft Hand Controller Development, '' NASA T N  D- 7884 
Volume IV, "Stowage and the Support Team Concept, " NASA TN D-7434 
Volume V, "Lighting Considerations, '' NASA TN D- 7290 
Louis D. Allen and Dale A .  Nussman 
Lyndon B. Jonnson Space Center 
vii 
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APOLLO EXPERIENCE REPORT 
CREW STATl ON I NTEGRATI ON 
VOLUME I - CREW STATl ON DES I GN AND DEVELOPMENT 
By Louis 0. A l l e n  and Dale A .  N u s s m a n  
Lyndon B. J o h n s o n  Space Cen te r  
SUMMARY 
Because of previous spacecraft design experience, the Apollo command module 
and lunar module were designed for  operation with full use  of human capabilities. As 
a result, automatic systems were used primarily to enhance crew safety or  mission 
performance. The flight stations were equipped and arranged to reflect the onboard 
command and control responsibilities of each crewman. Secondary crew stations were 
provided in both vehicles f o r  donning and doffing extravehicular support equipment, for  
guidance and navigation optical alinement operations, and fo r  crew resting. 
The development cycle fo r  the Apollo crew stations (and associated equipment) 
was  s imilar  to that of other aerospace programs: basic requirements were generated, 
a full-scale mockup o r  working model was developed, procedures for  using the equip- 
ment were developed, equipment and procedures were evaluated through simulation, 
and design and procedures were modified as required. Critical and complex crew 
station equipment and operations were evaluated under representative environmental 
conditions - within lighting mockups, vacuum test chambers, drop test vehicles, 
centrifuge modules, water immersion facilities, and variable- g aircraft .  
Literally thousands of multilevel design and operation exercises  and reviews 
held before the Apollo missions resulted in many improvements and refinements to 
crew station design and operations. Consequently, relatively f ew crew station anom- 
alies were experienced during actual flight operations, and those that occurred during 
the first five manned Apollo missions (Apollo 7 to  11) were unique and nongeneric. 
The success  of the Apollo crew station effort was attributable to four basic 
factors:  (1) the use of knowledge gained from prior aerospace experience and prac- 
tices; (2) the study, review, and simulation of new state-of-the-art designs and opera- 
tions; (3) the ability to control the many physical and operational interfaces that ex- 
isted; and (4) the effective communications and information dissemination between 
program organizational elements. Crew station specification documents delineating 
generic methodologies and requirements that evolved during the Apollo Program have 
been prepared fo r  use in subsequent programs. 
I NTRODUCTI ON 
This volume of the crew station integration series presents an overview of the 
Apollo crew station design and development efforts as well as the engineering ap- 
proaches used to  integrate the many physical and operational interfaces that existed in 
the Apollo spacecraft. The crew station design and development effort will be dis- 
cussed in a quasi- chronological, quasi- subjective manner. 
areas of the Apollo crew stations are not discussed in detail in this document. Indi- 
viduals who require further detail or  additional information about the Apollo crew sta- 
tion configuyations o r  experience a r e  referred to the succeeding volumes of this series 
and to other crew- station- related Apollo experience reports. 
The more specialized 
The first section of this report  addresses  the period of spacecraft evolution be- 
tween late 1959 and late 1962, during which a baseline definition of the functional and 
operational requirements for  the command module (CM) and lunar module (LM) crew 
stations was determined. 
The second and third sections concern, respectively, the refined crew station 
requirements, which were applied to the spacecraft design, and the spacecraft con- 
figurations that resulted. 
The fourth section presents the aspects of methodology, including the relevancy 
of pre- Apollo experience, and describes engineering tools and techniques; documenta- 
tion and operational plans; spacecraft and crew integration plans; meetings, reviews, 
and exercises; and the organizational approach. 
The fifth section is a chronological synopsis of selective events that occurred 
during the design and development of the Apollo CM and LM crew compartments. The 
intent is to give a representative sampling of significant events that i l lustrate the ap- 
plication of the engineering requirements and methodology discussed in earlier sections. 
The last section of the report  is a discussion of the in-flight experience during 
the Apollo 7 to 11 missions that concerned crew station equipment. 
As an aid to the reader,  where necessary the original units of measure have 
been converted to the equivalent value in  the SystGme International d'Unit6s (SI). The 
SI units are written first, and the original units are written parenthetically thereafter. 
SPACECRAFT EVOLUTION 
In the latter par t  of 1959, NASA began planning the development of advanced 
manned spacecraft systems. P r imary  effor ts  included (1) the preliminary design of a 
multiman spacecraft for  a circumlunar mission, with particular attention given to  
using the capsule as a temporary space laboratory, lunar-landing cabin, and deep- 
space probe; (2) mission analysis studies to  establish exit and reentry corridors,  
weights, and propulsion requirements; and (3) test program planning to determine the 
number and purpose of the missions to be flown. 
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These ear ly  efforts, coupled with a later (1961) national commitment to accom- 
plish a lunar landing within the decade, ultimately led to an initial definition of the 
Apollo Program and the establishment of baseline requirements for  the Apollo vehicle. 
As described in the Apollo Spacecraft Statement of Work of July 28, 1951, the program 
would consist of three phases: phase A would be composed of manned lnw-altitiide 
Earth-orbital flights lasting as long as 2 weeks and unmanned reentry flights from 
superorbital velocities; phase B would consist of circumlunar, lunar- orbital, and 
parabolic- reentry tes t  flights; and phase C would include manned lunar- landing- and- 
return missions (using either the NOVA-class o r  Saturn C- 3 launch vehicles). The 
1961 statement of work included the following requirements fo r  the Apollo spacecraft. 
1. Onboard control and monitoring of translunar spacecraft injection for  direct  
ascent and f o r  spacecraft injection from an Earth parking orbit 
2. Rendezvous and docking with a space laboratory module o r  other space 
vehicle 
3. Attitude control for  lunar landings and lift-offs and for  entering and leaving 
lunar orbit  
4. A single-engine service module (SM) propulsion system that would supply 
abort  propulsion after jettison of the launch escape system, all major velocity incre- 
ments and midcourse velocity corrections for missions before the lunar-landing at- 
tempt, and lunar launch propulsion and transearth midcourse velocity corrections 
5. A station for  the commander (CDR) in the left o r  center couch (Duties of the 
CDR would include control of the spacecraft in manual o r  automatic modes during all 
mission phases; selection, implementation, and monitoring of the guidance and navi- 
gation (G&N) modes; and monitoring and control of key a reas  of all systems during 
time- cri t ical  periods. ) 
5. A station for  the copilot (later designated as the command module pilot (CMP)) 
in  the left or  center couch (Duties of the CMP would include supporting the CDR as 
alternative pilot o r  navigator and monitoring certain key parameters  of the spacecraft 
and propulsion systems during crit ical  mission phases. ) 
7. A station for  the systems engineer (later designated as the lunar module 
pilot (LMP)) in  the right-hand couch (Duties would include responsibility for  all 
systems operations, serving as pr imary monitor of propulsion systems during crit- 
ical  mission phases, and responsibility for systems placed onboard primarily for eval- 
uation of later spacecraft. ) 
8. Arrangements of displays and controls to  reflect the duties of each crewman 
(This arrangement would be such that a single crewman could return the spacecraft 
safely t o  Earth;  all crewmen would be cross  trained so  that each could assume the 
duties of the others.) 
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9. The provision, for  each crewman, of a couch and restraint  system that 
would give full body and head support during all normal and emergency acceleration 
conditions 
10. The provision of shirt- sleeve garments, lightweight caps, and exercise and 
recreation equipment for  the crewmen 
The statement of work also delineated requirements for  a lunar-landing module, 
which at that time was envisioned as a third propulsion module equipped with landing 
gear  and other apparatus for lowering the command and service module (CSM) to the 
lunar surface. The propulsion system for the lunar-landing module would be a com- 
posite propulsion system consisting of multiple lunar- retrograde engines for  the gross  
velocity increments required for  lunar orbiting and lunar landing and a lunar-landing 
engine for velocity vector control, midcourse velocity control, and the lunar hover 
and touchdown maneuver. 
In December 1961, a contract was awarded for  the design and development of the 
CM and SM, the spacecraft adapter, associated ground support equipment, and space- 
craft  integration. The following month, preliminary layout drawings were initiated to 
define the elements of the CM configuration. Additional requirements and limitations 
imposed on the CM design at this time included a reduction in diameter, a paraglider 
compatibility for  landing (eventually deleted), 113 kilograms (250 pounds) of radiation- 
protection water (later deleted), redundant propellant tankage for  the attitude control 
system, and an increase in system weight and volume. After drawings depicting the 
location and orientation of the CM crew and equipment were prepared, engineering 
orders  were released for  the  construction of Apollo CM and SM full-scale mockups 
(fig. 1). 
At this time, the CM and SM were being designed to  support three approaches to  
the lunar-landing mission: Earth orbit rendezvous (EOR), direct  ascent (by use of a 
NOVA- class launch vehicle), and lunar orbit rendezvous (LOR). The lunar-landing 
techniques and possible CSM schemes for  supporting these approaches a r e  illustrated 
in figure 2. The advantages of the "dark horse" LOR approach became more apparent 
as design studies matured. The EOR approach involved the use of an unmanned module 
to decelerate the CM and SM for  descent t o  the lunar surface. Service-module engine 
power would be used for  lunar ascent and t ransear th  maneuvers. The LOR approach, 
on the other hand, involved the use of a second manned module for  independent descen- 
sion to  and ascension from the lunar surface from lunar orbit. The CSM would remain 
in lunar orbit fo r  eventual rendezvous and docking with the returning LM. 
In the spring of 1962, during a meeting held at NASA Headquarters and attended 
by representatives from various NASA offices, the LOR technique was selected as the 
mission mode for  the Apollo Program. Additional decisions reached at this  meeting 
included the following. 
1. The current concepts of the Apollo CM and SM would not be altered. 
2. A lunar excursion vehicle (subsequently called the LM) would be aft of the SM 
and in front of the Saturn N B  stage. (Procedures and mechanization f o r  the linkup of 
the CM and LM would require further study. ) 
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Figure 1.- Two views of CM mockup, 
circa 1962. 
Direct Earth orbit Lunar orbit 
rendezvous rendezvous 
Earth orbit 
Circumlunar 
Lunar landing 
Figure 2. - Concepts of lunar-landing 
flight techniques and spacecraft con- 
figurations for the Apollo Program, 
circa 1962. 
3. For crew safety, an escape tower would be used during launch. 
4. Two crewmen would occupy the LM, which would descend to the lunar surface, 
and both men would be able to leave the LM at the same time. 
5. The LM would have a pressurized cabin capable of being maintained for 1 
In July 1962, the newly established Manned Spacecraft Center (MSC) (now the 
week, even though a normal LOR mission would last only 24 hours. 
NASA Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center (JSC)) distributed a statement of work for the 
LM to prospective bidders. Key contractor responsibilities included the detail design 
and manufacture of the LM and related test articles, mockups, and other hardware 
with the exception of certain Government-furnished equipment (GFE) such as the G&N 
system (except the rendezvous radar and radar altimeter), the flight research and 
instrumentation system, the scientific instrumentation system, and certain components 
of the crew equipment system (space suit, portable life-support system (PLSS), and 
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personal radiation dosimeter). The contractor responsibilities a lso included the inte- 
gration of GFE into the LM; development of specifications fo r  equipment performance, 
interfaces, and design environment; and maintenance of interface control documenta- 
tion with respect to validity and currency. Additionally, the statement of work delin- 
eated the following operational requirements for  the LM. 
1. Before the first translunar midcourse correction, the LM would be trans- 
fe r red  from the stowed position in the spacecraft adapter to a docked configuration 
with the CSM. A t  a la ter  t ime in the mission, the two-man LM crew would enter the 
LM from the CSM through a hatch without being exposed to the space environment. 
Another hatch would allow access  to the LM during countdown and eg res s  into space 
when the LM was  docked with the CSM. 
2. The LM systems were to operate at their  normal design performance level 
for  2 days without resupply. Equipment normally operated in the pressurized LM 
cabin environment would be designed to function for  a minimum of 2 days in vacuum 
without failure. The LM pressurization system would be designed to accomplish six 
complete cabin repressurizations and to accommodate a continuous leak rate as high 
as 0.09 kg/hr (0.2 lb/hr). Provision would be made for  six recharges of the PLSS, 
which had a normal operating time of 4 hours without resupply. Under usual condi- 
tions in the LM cabin, the crew would wear unpressurized space suits. Either crew- 
man would be able to re turn the LM to the CSM and successfully perform the rendez- 
vous and the docking maneuver. 
3. The LM would be capable of independent separation from the CSM; lunar 
descent, landing, and ascent; and rendezvous and docking with the CSM. The LM 
would allow for  crew exploration in the vicinity of lunar touchdown but would not be 
required to have lunar surface mobility. Lunar landing would be attempted from a 
lunar orbit height of 185 kilometers (100 nautical miles). After separation, the LM 
would transfer from the circular  orbit to an equal-period elliptical orbit that would not 
intersect the lunar surface. The hovering, final touchdown maneuvers, and landing 
would be performed after the LM achieved the elliptical orbit. Normally, there would 
not be a requirement to reposition the LM attitude before lunar launch. After lunar 
launch, the LM would be t ransferred from an elliptical to  a circular  orbit before ren- 
dezvous and docking with the CSM, The LM would not be recoverable. 
Baseline requirements f o r  the LM crew station were also delineated in the state- 
ment of work. The flightcrew would consist of the CDR and the LMP, and the crew 
station equipment would include adjustable seats,  food and water, first- aid equipment, 
space suits, a PLSS for  each crewman; and personal radiation dosimeters.  
As with the CM, specifications of crew size, crew equipment, spacecraft  sys- 
tems, and mission technique for  the LM resulted in improved spacecraft volumetric 
definition. Because the LM would be operated only in space, aerodynamic stream- 
lining was not required. 
radically different shape of the LM, compared to  that of the CM. Relief f rom the aero- 
dynamic constraint a lso added flexibility to the packaging of the LM and therefore to 
the layout of the crew station area. One of the pr ime constraints affecting the exterior 
and interior design of both the LM and the CM was weight. The Apollo spacecraft 
weights had been apportioned within an assumed 41 000- kilogram (90 000 pound) limit - 
The absence of this requirement was  responsible for  the 
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a 4300-kilogram (9500 pound) CM and an 11 600-kilogram (25 500 pound) LM. In the 
years that followed, weight growth was a continuous problem, especially for the LM. 
The problem became so severe that certain flight instruments were deleted from the 
LM, and at one point the lunar surface television camera was seriously considered for 
deletion. 
In November 1962, a contract was awarded for  the design and development of the 
LM. The following year, a full-scale LM mockup was constructed that contained a crew 
station built and outfitted to comply with the program requirements. A model of the LM 
(circa 1962) is illustrated in figure 3. By the end of 1962, basic mission and crew sta- 
tion operations had been defined, basic spacecraft and crew equipment had been identi- 
fied, and the external and internal geometries of the CM and the LM had evolved to 
configurations not radically different from those of the "as flown" spacecraft (figs. 4 
to 6). 
Figure 3. -  A model of the LM, 
circa 1962. 
Figure 4.- The Apollo CSM, circa 1969. 
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Figure 6.- The Apollo 9 CM and LM in 
the docked configuration. 
Figure 5.- The Apollo 9 LM. 
CREW STAT1 ON REQU I REMENTS 
The CM and LM were designed for operation with full use of human capabilities. 
The spacecraft were designed to normally use inputs from Earth-based tracking and 
computing facilities in conjunction with the onboard systems; however, the CM and the 
LM were both provided with the capability of performing critical mission operations 
independent of ground facilities. Fundamental crew station requirements were as 
follows. 
1. Maintenance: In-flight maintenance shall not be performed on the vehicle 
subs ys tern s. 
2. Crew control: The flightcrew shall have the capability of controlling the 
vehicles throughout all flight modes. The crew shall initiate all abort modes when 
automatic systems are not required to ensure crew safety. 
3. Automation: Automatic systems shall be used only to enhance the performance 
of the mission. Manual overrides of automatic systems shall be provided where pos- 
sible. 
4. Safety: The design of the spacecraft and equipment shall minimize the pos- 
sibility of crew injury. Fire, explosion, toxicity, failure mode effects, and failure 
propagation shall be primary considerations. 
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5. Single crewman operation: The CM and LM shall be designed to  allow for  
operation by a single crewman in a contingency situation. 
6. Anthropometry: The vehicle design shall accommodate crewmen between the 
10th and 90th percentile for the following dimensions: weight, stmding height, sitting 
height (erect), buttock- to- knee length, knee height (sitting), hip breadth (sitting), 
shoulder breadth (bideltoid), and a r m  reach from wall. Other body dimensions shall  
fall within the 5th and 95th percentiles as defined by WDAC- TR- 52- 321. 
7. Docking: The spacecraft subsystems shall  be designed to  accommodate the 
two docking operations and the separation operation required for  the lunar- landing mis- 
sion. With the spacecraft in the docked configuration, an unaided crewman, in a pres- 
surized o r  unpressurized suit, shall be capable of performing all the functions neces- 
s a ry  to  accomplish intervehicular crew and equipment t ransfer  in either direction. 
8. Extravehicular crew transfer:  Handrails, restraints,  and exterior lighting 
shall be provided to  permit the extravehicular transfer of crewmen and scientific pay- 
loads between the vehicles, in a contingency mode. 
9. Crew station environment: The vehicles shall be designed with an environ- 
mental control system (ECS) that provides a normal shirt- sleeve environment: an oxy- 
gen p res su re  of 35 kN/m (5 psia), a temperature of 297 K (75" F), and a relative 
humidity of 40 to  70 percent. Provisions shall be included for  planned o r  contingency 
pressure-  suit operations, thermal control of equipment, PLSS charging, and pressuri-  
zation of the CM-LM tunnel and the LM. 
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10. Cabin arrangement: The cabin arrangement shall provide for  the effective 
performance of crew tasks and the efficient stowage of associated equipment and ex- 
pendables. The flight stations shall reflect the onboard command and control respon- 
sibilities of the crew and provide for active onboard management of the vehicle s u b  
systems. Secondary crew stations shall be provided for  the donning and doffing of 
extravehicular support equipment, for  G&N operations such as optical alinement, and 
for  crew resting. 
11. Support and restraint:  Crew support and restraint  shall be provided to  pro- 
tect  the crew and to  enable the performance of all tasks  associated with either a nomi- 
nal o r  an aborted mission. The crew shall be restrained during the powered portions 
of the flight and during zero-g conditions, principally to  counteract the forces generated 
by crew mobility. Supports and restraints  shall contribute minimum interference with 
the operation of and access  to  the controls and displays and shall not limit window use 
for external visibility. 
12. External visibility: Windows shall be provided primarily for  aiding in lunar 
landing, docking, and general navigation. 
13. Crew station lighting: Internal and external lighting shall be provided to  
permit the performance of all crew tasks. Control and display panel illumination shall 
be adjustable to  compensate f o r  varying ambient light conditions and to  ensure reten- 
tion of crew visual adaptation. Lighting shall be provided for  crew use  in illuminating 
remote o r  shadowed areas of the crew cabin. 
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14. External lighting: External lights shall be provided as visual aids in support 
of the rendezvous and docking maneuver (visual acquisition, attitude determination, and 
doc king alinem ent) . 
15. Displays and controls: The vehicles shall be provided with displays and 
controls that enable the flightcrew to  control and monitor relevant aspects of mission- 
related phenomena, 
C M  AND LM CREW STATION CONFIGURATIONS 
The Apollo 11 crew station configurations are discussed briefly in the following 
paragraphs. More detailed information is given in the succeeding voluines of this 
report, other crew- station- related Apollo experience reports, and the Apollo Opera- 
tions Handbook (AOH). The CM and LM configurations are discussed concurrently in 
the following paragraphs to emphasize the similari ty in the basic types of equipment 
used in both crew stations. The exterior spacecraft  configurations are briefly de- 
scribed so that the relationship between internal and external geometries and equip- 
ment may be established. 
Veh ic le  Ex te r io rs  
The exterior configurations of the CM and LM are illustrated in figures 4 to  6. 
The conical-shaped CM was approximately 3.4 meters  (11 feet) in height and 3.7 meters  
(12 feet) in diameter. By comparison, the box-shaped ascent stage of the LM was ap- 
proximately 2.7 meters  (9 feet) in height and 4.3 meters  (14 feet) in breadth. The 
substantial breadth of the LM was pr imari ly  attributable to  the added volume required 
for  consumables tankage; the bulk of CSM consumables was contained in the SM. The 
LM was equipped with an external platform approximately 0.9 meter  (3 feet) square, 
below the forward hatch, which provided the crewmen with workspace for  handling 
equipment during lunar surface extravehicular activity (EVA) and aided LM ingress 
and egress.  
C r e w  Compar tments  
Major equipment contained within the crew compartments of the CM (figs. 7 to  
14) and the LM (figs. 15 to 22) included controls and displays for  the operation of the 
spacecraft and spacecraft systems, res t ra int  harness  assemblies, window shades, 
crew equipment, food and water, and waste management provisions. Survival equip- 
ment and couches also were provided in  the CM. The CM had an interior volume of 
10.4 cubic meters  (366 cubic feet). Interior bays, lockers, couches, and crewmen ac- 
counted for 4.4 cubic meters  (156 cubic feet); therefore, a total free volume of 6 cubic 
meters  (210 cubic feet), or  2 cubic meters  (70 cubic feet) p e r  crewman, remained. 
The total interior volume of the LM crew compartment was 7 cubic meters  (235 cubic 
feet). Approximately two-thirds of this volume was in the 2.3-meter (92 inch) diameter 
forward cabin section, with the remaining volume in the 1.4-meter (54 inch) midsection. 
The LM volumetric values closely approximate two-thirds of the values specified f o r  the 
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CM (two-man as opposed to three-man occupancy). Total free volume was therefore 
approximately 4 cubic meters (140 cubic feet). 
Figure 7. - The CM interior - looking 
forward toward tunnel. 
Figure 8.- The CM interior- looking 
left and outboard. 
Figure 9. - The CM interior - looking 
right and outboard. 
Figure 10. - The CM interior - left- 
hand equipment bay (ECS equipment 
area). 
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Figure 11. - The CM interior - lower 
equipment bay (guidance, navigation, 
and control equipment location). 
Figure 12. - The CM interior - tunnel 
area with hatch installed. 
Figure 13.- The CM interior- hatch 
removed and probe installed. 
Figure 14.- The CM interior- side 
hatch in full- open position. 
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Figure 15. - The LM interior - forward 
section. 
Figure 17.- The LM interior- looking 
right and outboard. 
Figure 16. - The LM interior - looking 
left and outboard. 
Figure 18. - The LM interior - looking 
aft and left (ECS equipment location). 
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Figure 19. - The L M  interior - looking 
aft and right (stowed equipment area). 
Figure 20. - The LM interior - forward 
hatch. 
Figure 21. - The LM interior - 
over head hatch. 
.- 
Figure 22. - The LM interior - overhead 
hatch open and drogue installed. 
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Both vehicles were equipped with docking tunnels for  the t ransfer  of crewmen and 
equipment between the CM and the LM. The tunnels were sized to  allow passage of a 
crewman in a pressurized suit  with an attached extravehicular mobility unit (EMU). In 
each vehicle, access  to the tunnel area was provided by a hatch that could be operated 
from either side. The geometry of the LM interior enabled the LM hatch to be hinged 
m d  i.oiaied into t'ne LivI cabin, whereas the CM hatch had to  be removed and stowed in 
the CM cabin to permit tunnel operations. The LM tunnel contained the docking drogue 
and an electrical  umbilical fo r  routing power between the two vehicles. The docking 
probe was installed in the CM tunnel. To provide for  more flexible operations and to 
safeguard against certain failures, the mechanisms in the probe and drogue were de- 
signed to permit  removal f rom either end of the docking tunnel. A second hatch was 
provided on both vehicles. Side access  to o r  from the CM crew compartment was pro- 
vided by an outward-opening single integrated hatch assembly. Forward access  to o r  
f rom the LM crew compartment was provided by an  inward-opening hatch assembly. 
To augment ground operations and to provide for contingency flight operations, the 
cabin relief and dump valves installed in  all hatches were designed to  be operated from 
outside as well as inside the crew compartments. 
The CM was equipped with two triangular forward-viewing windows, two square 
side- observation windows, and a round hatch window. Two triangular forward windows 
in the LM provided visibility during the descent, ascent, and rendezvous and docking 
phases of the mission. A rectangular window directly above the LM flight station for  
the CDR provided visibility fo r  the overhead docking maneuvers. The windows in both 
vehicles were provided with thermal and antireflective coatings and window shades. 
Stowage Locations 
The numerous loose i tems of personal and systems equipment in the CM and the 
LM were stowed in compartments, lockers, and bags (figs. 7 to 22). Stowage com- 
partments were built into the interior walls of both the CM and the LM. Equipment 
was placed in "cushions" and inserted into these compartments. Removable aluminum 
lockers  with preinstalled cushions also were used in  both vehicles, The stowage com- 
partment and locker doors had retention mechanisms that could be actuated with one 
hand (an aid in zero-g operations). A variety of stowage bags also was used in both 
vehicles. The stowage containers were labeled for identification and as a location aid. 
In the CM, containers were numbered consecutively from fore  t o  aft; the numbers were 
prefixed with a letter designator of the bay, For example, right-hand equipment bay 
compartments were labeled R1 to  R13. In the LM, stowage a reas  and contents were 
identified by descriptive labels. Letter designators were not necessary in the LM be- 
cause the number of stowage i tems and configurations was considerably less than that 
in the CM. 
Couches and Restraints 
The CM was equipped with couches qualified to  support the crew during normal 
and contingency accelerations as high as 30g forward or  aft (*X), 18g up o r  down (kZ), 
and 15g laterally (*Y). Each couch consisted of a headrest-equipped body support with 
back pan, seat pan, leg  pan, and foot pan. Body support was accomplished by a web of 
Armalon (multiple layers  of f iberglass Beta cloth impregnated and covered with Teflon) 
15  
over the support frame. In the CM, the individual flight res t ra int  harnessesfor  the 
crewmen were attached to  the crew couches. Each harness  consisted of a lapbelt and 
two shoulder s t raps  that interfaced the lapbelt at the buckle. The lapbelt buckle was a 
lever- operated, three-point-release mechanism. In the LM, crew support was ac- 
complished by using restraint  cables (figs. 16 and 17) attached to  waist-high D-rings 
on the sides of the pressure  garment assembly (PGA). A constant-force ree l  control 
provided a downward force of approximately 135 newtons (30 pounds). Equipment re- 
straint  on the Apollo vehicles was accomplished with a variety of devjces; Velcro, 
utility straps, and bungees were the preferred items. Connections were made by using 
Velcro, hooks, clips, and snaps. 
Displays and Con t ro l s  
The displays and controls for  operation of the CM spacecraft and systems were 
Pr imary  displays and con- located throughout the crew compartment (figs. 7 to 14). 
t ro l s  were located on the main display console (MDC), which consisted of 14 subpanels. 
The flight control displays and controls were concentrated within panels 1 and 2 for  ac- 
ce s s  by the CDR o r  the CMP. The majority of other subsystem controls was distrib- 
uted in other panel areas that were accessible to the CMP or  the LMP. A G&N station, 
which included an optical sight and a display and keyboard (DSKY) for  addressing the 
Apollo G&N computer, was provided in the lower equipment bay (LEB). The display 
and control panels in the LM, with the exception of certain ECS items, were located in 
the forward section of the crew compartment (figs. 15 to 17). Pr imary  displays and 
controls were situated in the two main display panels, numbers 1 and 2, located direct- 
ly in front of the CDR and the LMP. Other subsystem displays and controls were dis- 
tributed among two lower center panels, two bottom side panels, two lower side panels, 
one center side panel, and two upper side panels. All circuit  breakers  were installed 
in the upper side panels located outboard from the CDR and the LMP. An ECS station 
containing suit plumbing outlets, valve controls, and other ECS i tems was  located in 
the LM midsection a r e a  immediately aft of the LMP (fig. 18), A G&N station, which 
contained an alinement optical telescope (AOT) with integrated controls, was provided 
between the flight stations of the CDR and the LMP. A DSKY, visually identical to the 
two located in  the CM, was located in the panel area directly beneath the AOT. 
Hand C o n t r o l  le r s 
Two three-axis pistol-grip hand controllers were provided in each vehicle fo r  
commanding attitude changes (figs. 11 and 15). 
motions about a palm- centered axis, yaw commands were implemented by motions about 
the grip longitudinal axis, and roll  commands were effected by a left-right motion. The 
LM attitude control assemblies were also used in an incremental landing-point desig- 
nator (LPD) mode during the final approach phase of the lunar landing. In this mode, 
the angular e r r o r  between the designated landing site and the desired landing s i te  was 
nulled by repetitive manipulation of an attitude control assembly (ACA). The LPD sig- 
nals from the ACA were directed to the LM guidance computer (LGC), which issued 
commands to  move f rom the designated landing site incrementally along the lateral and 
longitudinal axes. Angukaadormat ion  was obtained by using the, ,vrt ical  and horizon- 
tal scales of the LPD on the'left forward wi;Jow. 
Pitch commands were implemented by 
,-. 
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By using reaction control system (RCS) thrusters, the translation hand controllers 
in the CM and LM provided the means to accelerate the spacecraft manually along one 
or  more of its axes (figs. 11 and 15). These controllers were mounted with their  axes 
approximately parallel  to  those of the spacecraft, and the direction of movement was 
pilot oriented, 771e single internally redilnrlafit corrtm!!er ir, the C M  also provided t w ~  
special functions: clockwise movement of the T-shaped handle t ransferred spacecraft 
control f rom the command module computer (CMC) to the stabilization and control sys- 
tem (SCS), and counterclockwise movement provided manual abort initiation during the 
launch phase, if necessary. The LM controllers were dual-purpose devices in that 
they also enabled a manual throttling control of the descent engine. Moving a throttle- 
jets lever to the throttle position permitted an LM crewman to increase o r  decrease 
the magnitude of the descent engine thrust  by an up or down movement, respectively, of 
the controller. 
Lighting 
Exterior and interior lighting equipment on the Apollo vehicles aided in the per- 
formance of crew visual tasks. The interior lighting systems provided general cabin 
illumination, as well as displays and controls illumination. Fluorescent lamps pro- 
vided floodlighting of CM interior work areas,  and incandescent lamps were used in the 
LM. Integral panel and numerics lighting was provided in both vehicles by electrolu- 
minescent (EL) materials. High- intensity signal lights and tunnel lights were incan- 
descent. Pen flashlights were used for  supplementary lighting of difficult access  areas.  
Utility lights a lso were provided in the LM as backup to the pr ime cabin floodlighting 
system. In the CM, a dual-powered/dual-filament design was used in the floodlighting 
systems to provide a redundancy capability. The exterior lighting systems enabled the 
Apollo crews to  visually guide and orient the LM and CSM to achieve successful track- 
ing and docking. Exterior lighting on the CM consisted of a docking spotlight, eight 
running lights for orientation, a docking target (mounted inside the right-hand rendez- 
vous window), an EVA floodlight, and a rendezvous beacon. Exterior lighting on the 
LM consisted of a radioluminescent docking target, five docking lights for orientation, 
and a high- intensity tracking light. 
Optical Equipment and Aids  
Several optical devices and aids were provided on the Apollo vehicles in addition 
to the G&N optical sights. Items used included a crew optical alinement sight (COAS), 
window markings, CM internal viewing mir rors ,  and a monocular for  lunar survey 
from the CM, The COAS was s imilar  to an aircraft gunsight and consisted of a col- 
limated reticle with vertical, horizontal, and radial scales. The pr imary function of 
the COAS was to  provide the LM and CM crewmen with precise information regarding 
relative angles between the CM and LM during the docking maneuver. The CM COAS 
could be used in either the left  o r  right rendezvous windows. The LM COAS could be 
used in either the overhead or left windows. 
The left and right rendezvous and hatch windows of the CM were equipped with 
markings to  aid f$$ crew in monitoring the entry maneuver. An LPD scale was scribed 
onto the left f0rwZl.d window in the LM to aid in monitoring and updating the G&N- 
computed lunar-landing point. A scribed scale was also provided in the LM overhead 
.c 
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docking window for monitoring vehicle attitude during lunar lift- off, rendezvous, and 
docking. 
Internal viewing mirrors  were used in the CM to aid a reclined crewman in buck- 
ling and adjusting the restraint harness and in locating couch controls and space-suit 
connectors. When a crewman was in a pressurized suit and in a reclined position 011 a 
CM couch, the lower edge of the MDC blocked normal visibility of these areas. 
METHODOLOGY 
Re levancy of Pre-Apol lo Experience 
Many of the design and operational approaches used in the Apollo Program were 
derived directly from the Gemini Program. A comparison of the Gemini and Apollo 
crew station configurations (figs. 23 and 24 compared with figs. 7 to 22, respectively) 
illustrates that state- of- the-art display and control devices such as fly-by- wire hand 
controllers and computer keyboards were introduced in the Gemini Program and car- 
ried over into the Apollo Program. Gemini Program experience also fostered knowl- 
edge of crew station concepts in terms of modular stowage, frequency of crew equip- 
ment use, zero-g handling procedures, and interface control of equipment. Many of 
the requirements that were established for  Gemini displays and controls and other 
crew station equipment were applied to  Apollo equipment. 
An important aspect of the information gained from the Gemini Program origi- 
nated in the CM and LM design reviews in which the Gemini crews participated. The 
early Gemini pilots, for  example, ascertained that digital rather than analog timers 
Figure 23. - Gemini spacecraft interior. Figure 24. - The command pilot's 
instrument panels in the Gemini 
spacecraft. 
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were essential f o r  performing time- cri t ical  spacecraft operations. 
a need f o r  a capability to dim the floodlighting of individual crew stations; this dimming 
would enable out-the- window night viewing for one crewman while another crewman 
read onboard data. As a resul t  of the Gemini pilot inputs, all subsequent flight stations 
were equipped with digital t imers  and individual lighting controls. 
They also identified 
Certain elements of Apollo crew station design and operations could not be based 
on previous aerospace experience. The Gemini Program had demonstrated the feasi- 
bility of rendezvous and docking, but the transfer of men and equipment between docked 
vehicles that was necessary during the Apollo Program had not been attempted. The 
Gemini Program, as well as Project Mercury, had demonstrated the feasibility of 
zero-g operations and the need fo r  zero-g restraints, but 1/6-g operations (as on a 
lunar-landing mission) had not been experienced. Experience from the Gemini Pro- 
gram and Project Mercury had furnished answers to many questions relative to  interior 
and exterior lighting and visibility requirements, but many questions remained unan- 
swered in regard to the near-lunar and lunar- surface lighting environments. 
The Apollo crew station integration task was  enormously complicated, compared 
to that of the Gemini Program. The Apollo concept required the design of two dis- 
tinctly different types of vehicles (the CM and the LM), a design that provided for  the 
t ransfer  of men and equipment between the vehicles, and a design that permitted lunar 
orbit and lunar surface operations. These factors caused a substantial increase in the 
number of physical and operational interfaces between the flightcrew and the spacecraft 
hardware, The Apollo 11 spacecraft (CM and LM) flew with approximately 350 crew 
station displays, 1100 controls, and 600 types of stowable equipment. Approximately 
400 stowage line i tems were stowed in the CM, and 200 were stowed in  the LM. Ap- 
proximately 50 of these line i tems were transferred from the CM to the LM before the 
lunar landing, The Apollo spacecraft contained four t imes  as much equipment as that 
flown on the Gemini spacecraft, which typically contained approximately 90 displays, 
350 controls, and 150 types of stowage equipment, 
Engineering Tools and Techniques 
Many of the engineering tools and techniques used to  develop Apollo crew com- 
partment design and operations were standardized devices and procedures that have 
been used fo r  most aircraft programs. In fact, some of these tools and techniques 
have been standardized to  the extent that they a re  delineated within mili tary specifica- 
tions as mandatory requirements f o r  all military systems, equipment, and facilities, 
as in Military Specification MIL-H-46855. The standard tools and techniques used fo r  
the Apollo effort included the application of human engineering principles and cr i te r ia  
in system engineering analysis; experiments, laboratory tests, and studies required to 
resolve human engineering and life- support problems specific to  the system; construc- 
tion of three- dimensional full- scale mockups of equipment involving critical human 
performance; dynamic simulation; application of human engineering principles to  equip- 
ment detail design drawings, work environment, and facilities design and performance 
and design specifications; development of procedures for  operating, maintaining, o r  
otherwise using the system equipment, based on human performance functions and tasks  
identified in system engineering and tasks  analysis; and integrated man and machine 
demonstration and certification tests. 
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Many of the specialized engineering tools and techniques used in Apollo crew sta- 
tion efforts were actually conceived during the Gemini Program and were subsequently 
improved during the Apollo Program. Included in this category were the variable- g 
aircraft, used to  evaluate crew equipment and operations under zero-g o r  lunar-g con- 
ditions; neutral- buoyancy simulators (water immersion facilities) for  zero- g and 1/6- g 
evaluations; full- s ize  docking simulators and simulations; the use of in-flight photog- 
raphy to evaluate the functioning of crew station equipment in unmanned research  and 
development (R&D) spacecraft; the scheduling of periodic crew/crew- equipment integra- 
tion and implementation meetings; the preparation and use  of a spacecraft/crew integra- 
tion plan to define the specific participation by flightcrews and flightcrew support t eams 
in spacecraft reviews, testing, and prelaunch operations; the preparation and mainte- 
nance of spacecraft stowage drawings; and the periodic scheduling of bench reviews and 
crew compartment fit and function (CCFF) reviews fo r  crew equipment. 
Tools and techniques developed especially for, or  which supported, Apollo crew 
station efforts included an MSC plan for  close monitoring and evaluation of the opera- 
tional aspects of contractor engineering simulation programs by astronauts, flightcrew 
training personnel, and flightcrew integration personnel; periodic guidance and control 
implementation meetings; preparation and maintenance of interface control drawings 
and documents to define and control functional and hardware interfaces between equip- 
ment supplied by different parties; use of standardization documents f o r  nomenclature 
control of crew station displays and controls; generation of a nonmetallic mater ia ls  
document to  delineate selection and acceptance guidelines relative to  nonmetallic mate- 
rials and test requirements for  the control of flammability and toxicity of nonmetallic 
materials used in the Apollo spacecraft; and a photographic documentation plan that 
specified required photography of each individual spacecraft through all stages of manu- 
facturing and testing, including vehicle closeout. 
Documenta t ion  and Operat ional  P lans  
It has been stated that "the enormity of the Apollo-Saturn launch vehicle is only 
exceeded by the volume of paperwork which was required to build and launch the vehi- 
cle. " Therefore, enumeration of all the types of data used t o  develop Apollo crew sta- 
tion design and operations would not be possible (nor desirable) in this report; however, 
key data will be mentioned briefly. 
The documentation and operational plans, in approximate chronological order  of 
development, included top-level mission and vehicle end- item specification documents, 
which delineated contractual mission and vehicle requirements; a lunar-landing mission 
design plan, which delineated crew functions, assignments, and tasks  for  both normal 
and alternate mission sequences; conceptual crew- station- arrangement drawings; an 
Apollo subsystem management plan, which defined the responsibilities for the engineer- 
ing of the Apollo subsystems; a plan of action for  close monitoring and evaluation of 
operational aspects of contractor engineering simulation programs by astronauts and 
by flightcrew training and integration personnel; equipment specification documents and 
control drawings; a design reference mission document, which described a single mis- 
sion and served as a basis fo r  project reporting and continuing spacecraft  design and 
operational studies; an LM spacecraft/crew- interface reduced- gravity test plan; inter- 
face control documents, which controlled multiparty physical, functional, and opera- 
tional interfaces; mission rules  documents, which established both general and specific 
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rules  and requirements in regard to total mission operations; a spacecraft/crew inte- 
gration plan for  manned Apollo missions; reports on failure modes and effects analysis; 
AOH’s, which contained detailed information on the individual vehicles, events, and 
procedures applicable to the scheduled mission; spacecraft stowage l ists;  dedicated 
forming specific manned Apollo missions; a nonmetallic materials requirements docu- 
ment, released as a postfire corrective item fo r  increased control on nonmetallic mate- 
rials used in the crew compartments; a crew procedures control plan, which specified 
methods t o  be used to  control flightcrew procedures delineated in the Apollo flight plans 
and procedures documents; and a rigorous crew station ghotography plan. 
Interface control documents and/or drawings were used to  define and control 
Annlln flicrhf nlans,  ~;d~ich  gChe&led spacpcrdt  nper&iGns ar?d c.,rey: activities fer nnv- a- r*---- r u A  --y-**” *** 
functional and hardware interfaces between equipment supplied by CM, LM, and EMU 
contractors and the Government. More than 200 interface control documents and draw- 
ings were required to  adequately define the interfaces that existed within and between 
the spacecraft. This number i l lustrates the complexity of the crew station integration 
task. 
Mission rules  documents established both general and specific rules  and require- 
ments in regard to total mission operations. The rules were formulated from the in- 
puts of the principal par t ies  responsible for  mission operations. 
Spacecraft stowage drawings were developed as a tool to manage the large quan- 
tity of equipment carr ied in the CM and LM crew stations. Spacecraft stowage draw- 
ings consisted of a top assembly drawing that was divided into four main categories: 
(1) a listing of all the loose crew equipment (equipment that a crewman could remove, 
without tools, f rom one location and place in another location), (2) a three-dimensional 
view of the crew equipment arrangement in a modular container, (3) a three-dimensional 
view of crew equipment arrangement in a spacecraft crew station volume, and (4) a 
modular container location in the spacecraft, 
Spacecraf t lCrew 1 ntegrat ion P lan  
During the Apollo Program, a plan was developed that specifically defined the 
participation of the pr imary  and backup flightcrews, as well as the flightcrew support 
team (FCST) assigned to  a particular mission, in  the Apollo spacecraft reviews, in 
spacecraft  checkout testing, and in  prelaunch operations. Flightcrew participation was 
necessary pr imari ly  to verify the spacecraft/crew interface and to ensure the opera- 
tional acceptability of installed equipment. A secondary purpose was to  allow the flight- 
crew to  gain valuable operational experience with flight hardware and to become famil- 
iar with specific and unique characterist ics of the assigned spacecraft. 
As  detailed in the spacecraft/crew integration plan for  manned Block I1 Apollo 
CSM and LM missions, an FCST was assigned t o  each mission. 
of a team leader, a CSM and an  LM crew station engineer, a CSM and an LM space- 
craft  engineer, and a training coordinator, The FCST provided the assigned flight- 
crews with both general and specific support in tasks  ranging from certification of the 
official stowage list to evaluation of emergency ingress and egress  procedures in the 
rescue training facilities at the NASA John F. Kennedy Space Center (KSC). Equipment 
liaison groups and support specialists were also assigned to each flightcrew. 
Each FCST consisted 
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The liaison group assisted the FCST in the integration of flightcrew equipment 
with the spacecraft to support the Apollo Spacecraft Program Office (ASPO) program 
schedules. The support specialists provided important supplementary support f o r  each 
flightcrew and team in areas such as EVA procedures and training, checklist develop- 
ment, and experiment integration. 
The integration plan specified that the assigned flightcrew and the associated 
FCST would participate in  spacecraft crew station reviews and spacecraft crew com- 
partment design reviews (preliminary design reviews and configuration design reviews) 
held fo r  their particular spacecraft. The purpose of crew station reviews was (1) to 
demonstrate the crew interfaces with the spacecraft  equipment and the crew- associated 
equipment, as well as the equipment-to-spacecraft interfaces, as defined in the inter- 
face control documents o r  drawings and other contractor documents and (2) to allow 
flightcrew evaluation of the stowage, installation, and use of this equipment with re- 
spect t o  mission objectives, requirements, and t ime line. These reviews were con- 
ducted, as required, at the contractor's facilities, with CM and LM spacecraft  mockups 
and suitable crew equipment mockups o r  flight- configured equipment. The purpose of 
the spacecraft crew compartment design reviews was t o  verify that the specific space- 
craft  design requirements would provide a spacecraft configuration capable of satisfy- 
ing the mission objectives for  the particular flight. 
The integration plan also contained a listing of the detailed checkout specifications, 
the operational checkout procedures, and the test and checkout procedures requiring 
flightcrew participation. The flightcrew and/or the FCST was to review the preliminary 
specifications or  procedures for  each of the tests in  which crew participation was man- 
datory, and their  concurrence was required before signoff. Table I exemplifies the 
type of crew participation in detailed tests. The CCFF test held at KSC for  each vehicle 
was  the key test for  certifying the operational configuration of flightcrew equipment. 
The test was performed to  demonstrate (1) that each crew equipment flight item was 
functionally and physically compatible with the spacecraft  in which it was to  be used, 
(2) that all equipment was compatible as a package, and (3) that the stowage provisions 
were compatible with the mission sequence. For the CCFF test, each spacecraft  was 
powered up t o  functionally check all electrical  interfaces fo r  loose equipment. A func- 
tional demonstration of all spacecraft  lighting was also performed at that time. 
Meetings, Reviews, and Exercises 
Literally thousands of meetings, reviews, and exercises  were required to  develop 
and integrate Apollo crew station design and operations. The pr ime crew station meet- 
ings, in  approximate chronological order,  included conceptual design meetings on crew 
station subsystems (e. g o ,  lighting and displays and controls); LM/CM commonality 
meetings to explore areas in which commonality might be achieved; Apollo docking in- 
terface panel meetings, in which the design trade-offs of various docking schemes were 
evaluated; Block I1 CM design definition meetings; MSC mockup requirements meetings; 
Apollo guidance and control implementation meetings, consisting of the various ele- 
ments involved in guidance, navigation, and control (GN&C) development (e. g., hard- 
ware, software, procedures, simulation, and training personnel; pilots; management; 
and integration personnel); crew integration systems meetings; spacecraft  design in- 
tegration system meetings; interface control document/drawing meetings; postfire 
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TABLE I. - CREW PARTICIPATION IN TEST AND CHECKOUT 
PROCEDURES AT KSCa 
Mandatory 
I 
TCP number 
Optional 
K-3128 
K-0070 
bK- 0048 
bK-0034 
K-8241 
Manned spacecraft operations building 
CM-LM mechanical docking 
Combined systems test 
Emergency egress  and simulated 
altitude run 
CSM altitude chamber run 
High-gain antenna checkout and PLSS 
communications test  
Vertical assembly building 
I 
X 
X 
X 
I 
X 
K-0005 
K-0004 
K-0006 
1 Integrated systems test  
Electrical  mate and interface tes t  
Plugs-in integrated test 
l x  
X 
X 
K- 0028 
K- 1222 
bK- 5 1 17 
bK- 0007 
Pad 
Flight readiness test 
CSM-LM systems interface test 
Flightcrew countdown 
Countdown demonstration test/ 
launch countdown 
X 
X 
X 
a 
bRequires suited crew and must be preceded by TCP K-3233 (Crew suiting). 
Spacecraft 106 and subsequent. 
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redesign meetings; mockup configuration requirements meetings, held at the contractor 
facility t o  discuss the proposed delivered configuration of CM and LM mockups; CSM 
and LM configuration control panel meetings, conducted by the ASPO to consider pro- 
posed engineering changes; Apollo configuration control board meetings, conducted by 
ASPO to act on changes of known or potential major impact on Apollo missions or 
changes affecting more than one facet of program design or  operations; flight opera- 
tions plan meetings; crew procedures control board meetings; Apollo EVA task force 
meetings; and FCST meetings. 
The main reviews and exercises,  again in approximate chronological order,  in- 
cluded conceptual design mockup inspections; an evaluation of the concept of a standing 
operator for  the LM; informal crew station preliminary subsystem design reviews; an 
in-house study of the Block I CM crew station design by the crewmen and support per- 
sonnel; a study of LM onboard checkout equipment requirements, which concluded that 
dedicated equipment of this type was not required; a study of the interactions of mis- 
sion and subsystem constraints on the design of lunar- surface- stay activities, which 
established a 3 5- hour lunar- stay model; Block I1 CM and LM displays and controls 
working group reviews; a Block I CM crew compartment lighting review; an MSC study 
of potential common-use hardware, which excluded most crew station hardware from 
common use on both the CM and LM vehicles because of conflicts in environmental re- 
quirements and schedules; zero-g and lunar-g flight tests in the KC-135 aircraf t  fo r  
evaluation of crew mobility in the LM cabin; final design reviews of crew station hard- 
ware (e. g., floodlights and attitude indicators) at vendor facilities; an LM crew mo- 
bility review held before the LM critical design review; CM and LM crit ical  design re- 
views to  certify the acceptability of the vehicle design for  re lease fo r  fabrication; post- 
flight analysis of in-flight photography and data f rom unmanned R&D flights; postfire 
Block 11 CM and LM design redefinition reviews; CSM preliminary design concept re- 
views (preliminary design reviews) held to  review proposed redesigns in the areas of 
basic configuration of internal stowage provisions, ECS modifications, crew- operated 
mechanisms related to  the unitized couch, the unified hatch, and various secondary 
i tems affecting crew operations; customer acceptance readiness reviews to  formally 
review the manufacturing accomplishments fo r  each vehicle, t o  evaluate systems per- 
formance as obtained during checkout operations, and to verify that all mission con- 
s t ra ints  were valid and that the module was capable of stated performance and ready 
for  delivery; an  LM lighting/reflection review conducted in  the LM mission simulator 
at MSC to examine potential window reflection problems resulting from approved fire- 
proofing changes; CM foldable- crew- couch reviews; evaluations of CM EVA hardware 
and procedures in  the KC-135 aircraf t  and in the water immersion facility (WIF); 
vehicle weight reduction reviews; evaluations of LM crew station procedures and lunar- 
surface tasks in the KC-135; and CSM and LM thermal-vacuum tests in  the Space En- 
vironmental Simulation Laboratory at MSC. 
Crewmen assigned to specific missions also participated in a multitude of opera- 
tional, mission-peculiar reviews and exercises  not previously listed. These reviews 
included bench checks of CM and LM crew equipment, altitude chamber tests fo r  their  
specific vehicles, and specialized equipment exercises.  The Apollo 11 prime crew 
participated in approximately 40 of these mission-peculiar reviews. 
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A Unique Organizational Approach 
The magnitude and complexity of the Apollo crew station design and development 
task required new approaches in organizational methodology. In response to  this chal- 
lenge, several  organizational structures and entities were established at MSC tha-t were 
rather unique to aerospace crew compartment development programs. These organiza- 
tional tools contributed significantly to the success of the Apollo crew station develop- 
ment effort. 
Three engineering organizations at MSC shared the responsibilities of crew sta- 
tion development. An engineering and development (E&D) Organization had the pr imary 
responsibility for  hardware development and integration, including implementation of 
requirements, manufacturing, test, and checkout. A separate flightcrew integration 
organization had the pr imary responsibility for flightcrew/vehic:e interface and inte- 
gration. A third organization served as a focal point in the ASP0 fo r  the analysis and 
resolution of crew integration requirements and problems, These MSC organizations 
worked closely with their  contractor counterparts, often on a day-to-day basis, in the 
resolution of crew station development problems. 
The flightcrew integration organization coordinated the design, development, and 
operational aspects of the Apollo crew station and of the crew-related interfaces and 
served as the focal point for  the coordination of all crew requirements and inputs into 
flight hardware development and checkout. Crew station subsystem managers in this 
organization were assigned the pr imary responsibility of coordinating the develop- 
mental and operational capabilities of the spacecraft as related to crew interfaces. 
The function of the crew station subsystem managers complemented the hardware- 
responsibility function of the hardware subsystem managers of the E&D organization. 
The FCST was also structured within the flightcrew integration group at MSC. The key 
responsibilities of the flightcrew integration organization included the following. 
1. Establishment of crew-related functional design c r i te r ia  for  spacecraft crew 
stations, including lighting, displays and controls, stowage, and crew access  and ac- 
c om m odations 
2. Support and management of crew station and crew-related interfaces during 
design, development, and implementation 
3. Development of requirements f o r  and procurement, fabrication, and mainte- 
nance of mockups, t ra iners ,  and other supportive equipment for  flightcrew training 
and evaluation of crew station equipment 
4. Design, development, procurement, fabrication, and management of crew 
operational equipment (e. g., cameras) in support of operational and experimental 
objectives fo r  manned Apollo missions 
5. Provision of equipment and support fo r  developmental and operational pro- 
cedures and tests in zero-g aircraft;  also, operation of WIF's to develop equipment 
and procedures and to  provide training f o r  crews when simulated variable-g levels were 
necessary f o r  extended t ime periods 
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6. Provision of support teams to coordinate the availability of all stowed equip- 
ment to support flight hardware tes t s  and launch schedules, to  participate in the stowage 
of spacecraft for  tes t s  and for  launch, to  assist during tes t  and checkout flows at major 
spacecraft reviews, and to serve as the focal point for  contact with the crew before 
lift- off 
7. Development, management, and scheduling of systems training for  f lightcrews, 
flight controllers, and other Government and contractor personnel 
The involvement of MSC astronauts in all facets of Apollo crew station design and 
operations contributed greatly to the success of the Apollo Program. Astronauts were 
involved in ear ly  Apollo Program decisions, such as the change from the EOR to the 
LOR mode fo r  lunar missions, and they participated in most of the simulations, meet- 
ings, reviews, exercises, and tes ts  previously discussed in this report. In addition, 
astronauts served or  were represented on all high-level change and review boards and 
on most lower level boards. 
Before assignment to a specific mission, astronauts were assigned individual 
responsibilities in technical disciplines, ranging from familiarization with Apollo mis- 
sion operations and software to  membership in the KSC altitude chamber board. This 
arrangement was beneficial in several  aspects including improved dissemination of 
information, presentation of the "pilot's point of view, '' and of course the preflight edu- 
cational value to  the astronauts themselves. Astronaut participation in crew station 
design and development did not end with a flightcrew assignment for  a particular mis- 
sion; instead, participation was redirected to aspects pertaining to end- item hardware 
and the operations to be used in accomplishing their  specific mission. 
DESIGN AND DEVELOPMENT EXPERIENCE 
The information that follows is a chronological synopsis of selected events that 
occurred during the design and development of the Apollo CM and LM crew compart- 
ments. The intent is to give a representative sampling of significant events that il- 
lustrate the application of the engineering requirements and methodology discussed in 
the previous sections of this report. Where s imilar  events occurred for  both Apollo 
vehicles (CM and LM), reference to the experience on both vehicles is generally omitted 
for  the sake of brevity (e. g., the conceptual LM mockup reviews were arbi t rar i ly  se- 
lected for discussion although conceptual reviews were conducted for  both spacecraft). 
1962 
July IO, 1962. - The first Apollo CM spacecraft mockup inspection was held at 
the contractor's facility. 
September 1962. - A completed wooden mockup of the interior arrangement of the 
Apollo CM was received at MSC f rom the CSM contractor. An identical mockup was re- 
tained by the contractor f o r  design control. Seven additional CM and SM mockups were 
planned: a partial  adapter interface, a CM f o r  exterior cabin equipment, a complete 
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SM, two spacecraft for  handling and transportation, a crew support system, and a com- 
plete CSM. A mockup of the G&N equipment had been completed. 
December 21, 1962. - A lunar-landing mission design plan that described crew 
activities f o r  the Apollo lunar- landing mission was prepared. 
functions, assignments, and tasks  fo r  both normal and alternate mission sequences. 
Crew activities were based on the following basic guidelines. 
The plan delineated crew 
1. The spacecraft will be designed for manual operation with no requirement for  
unmanned missions. 
2. P r imary  command will be onboard the spacecraft. The capability will exist 
to  perform the mission independent of ground- based information t o  increase reliability, 
accuracy, and performance. 
3. The crew will control o r  direct  the control of the spacecraft throughout all 
mission phases. Status of systems will be displayed for  crew assessment  and mode 
selection. The spacecraft will be designed so that a single crewman can return the 
CM to a preselected Earth landing site. 
4, Automatic systems will be used to  obtain precision o r  speed of response o r  to 
relieve the crew of tedious tasks. All automatic control modes will have manual back- 
up modes. 
5. The initiation and subsequent control of aborts will be primarily the respon- 
sibility of the crew. Mission Control Center crew safety responsibility will consist of 
advising the crew of observed malfunctions and recommending a course of action. 
6. An in-flight tes t  system (IFTS) will be used by the crew to  implement fault 
detection and isolation. Spare IFTS components and modules will be provided so that 
the crew can accomplish onboard maintenance and repair .  (This scheme was la te r  
abandoned in favor  of increased system reliability and redundancy. See discussion of 
"First Quarter of 1964" later in this section. ) 
1963 
March 5 and 6, 1963.- A spacecraft lighting meeting was conducted at the CSM 
contractor's facility with the CSM and LM contractors and MSC personnel participating. 
Requirements f o r  a flashing rendezvous light, external position lights, and exterior 
vehicle floodlights were discussed. Internal lighting techniques were also discussed. 
Only a few CM instruments would be integrally lighted, whereas all LM instruments 
would have (red) integral lighting. The CM would have 10 floodlights equipped with red 
filters capable of being swiveled; the. LM would have separate red  and white floodlight 
systems. The CM panels would be illuminated by floodlighting; the LM would have 
edgelighting (probably EL). 
March 12, 1963. - The LM contractor completed a NASA-requested study on the 
feasibility of using CM and Gemini hardware for  the LM design. Fo r  the purpose of 
this study, common- usage hardware was subdivided into four classifications: complete 
common usage, modified common usage, potential common usage, and noncommon 
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usage. The study concluded that the G&N displays were the only equipment that could 
be classified as completely common usage (i. e., the hardware could be accepted and 
installed as is, without modifications). Four Gemini meters  were classified as modified 
common usage and the remaining display and control hardware as potentially common 
or  noncommon. The LM contractor noted its findings to be preliminary because much 
of the possible common-usage equipment had not been completely defined, other equip- 
ment had not been specified, and most had not been mechanized. 
August 7, 1963.- A 2-month evaluation of the concept of a standing operator fo r  
the LM was completed by MSC. The evaluation consisted of engineering studies and 
the preliminary design of several  configurations, including mockup hardware. It was 
concluded that a standing-operator concept was indeed feasible fo r  the LM and offered 
several  advantages over the more conventional seated- operator concept, including im- 
proved external area of view with smaller  windows, increased mobility for  seat area 
ingress and egress,  and substantial weight saving in seat and window structure. Pho- 
tographs, sketches, and other data were subsequently forwarded to the LM contractor 
for  use in  the design of the LM restraint  system. 
September 16 to  18, 1963.- The first official LM mockup review was conducted 
at the contractor's facility. The principal ar t ic le  fo r  inspection and review was the 
M- 1 mockup, which was a full-scale representation of the LM ascent stage crew com- 
partment constructed pr imari ly  of wood and cardboard. The compartment was equipped 
with models of basic equipment, including two crew support and restraint  concepts des- 
ignated as the "cage" (restraint  s t raps  built into a metal framework that closely fit the 
astronaut's shape) and the "barstool" (a metal stool and overhead restraint  straps).  
Two crew-mobility'demonstration r igs  (plywood representations of the ingress/egress 
tunnels, hatches, and interior confines of the crew compartment) were used in conjunc- 
tion with an overhead support arrangement to simulate 1/6-g lunar operations. In ad- 
dition to  the M- 1 mockup, five full-scale representations of alternate forward- cabin 
geometric configurations were displayed. 
The objectives of the M-1 mockup review were to establish a procedure fo r  this 
and subsequent mockup reviews; to review and establish a design f reeze  on the frontal 
geometry of'the ascent stage; and to  inspect, review, and critique crew visibility, gen- 
eral location and placement of display panels, seating and restraint ,  location and basic 
type of hand controller, hatch arrangement and space allocation for  ingress/egress,  
ingress/egress procedures, and crew station and cabin equipment arrangement. 
A total of 33 requests for  action were submitted during the review. The signifi- 
cant results were as follows. 
1. Review procedures: The procedures established during the review generally 
were acceptable. 
2. Ascent stage geometry: The frontal geometry of the ascent stage was deter- 
mined t o  be acceptable, with minor exceptions (noted later). 
3. Crew visibility: The window shape and visibility provided f o r  the design eye 
position were acceptable. The contractor was requested t o  study the possibility of 
improving visibility from the forward eye position, (It was also noted that a study of 
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the adequacy of the M-1 windows fo r  the MSC proposed ascent guidance technique would 
be required. ) 
4. Panel location and placement: Further improvements might be realized in 
coiijaiiction with the sspport  res t rz int  sti-idy. The detailed location uf specific dispiay 
instruments required further improvement. 
5. Support and restraint:  The concept of a standup posi t im fo r  both LM crew- 
men was approved. It was believed, however, that the M-1 restraint  provisions unduly 
restr ic ted crew mobility. 
6. Location and type of hand controller: Controllers were positioned too low 
and lacked suitable a r m  support for  fine control. The basic type of hand controller 
could not be evaluated in this  mockup. 
7. Hatch arrangement and space allocation for  ingress/egress:  The provisions 
were satisfactory except that the use  of a special tool fo r  hatch operation was ques- 
tioned. 
8. Ingress/egress procedures: The procedures were considered acceptable, 
It was shown that reduction of the hatch diameter at the exit end would be undesirable. 
9. Crew station arrangement: The arrangement was generally acceptable. 
Specific details of flight control provisions would require further MSC/contractor 
study. 
10. Cabin equipment arrangement: The arrangement was adequate to the degree 
represented. 
October 28, 1963. - An LM- CM displays and controls commonality meeting was 
held at MSC to  explore areas in which commonality might be achieved and to  provide a 
plan of action. Areas  discussed included principles of layout, switch and nomenclature 
conventions, and common specifications - both functional and environmental. Discus- 
sion of certain subsystems resulted in an  identification of areas of commonality unique 
to a subsystem as well as in general guidelines applicable to  all display and control 
items. I tems discussed included the following. 
1. Switch position and location conventions: General agreement was reached 
that the principles in aircraft standards and military specifications were applicable. 
2. Lighting systems and criteria: The difference in mission environments jus- 
tified the wide difference in lighting systems between the CM and LM. 
colors, and extinguishment techniques were agreed upon. 
Signal lights, 
3. Hardware commonality: It was  generally agreed that, in the a rea  of s imilar  
equipment, the greatest  program cost and schedule benefits could be derived from the 
cornmoll vendor approach (as opposed to  a common specification approach), thus ef- 
f ecting joint procurement. 
4. Preparation of interface control documents: It was agreed that the results of 
the meeting should precipitate the preparation of interface control documents addressed 
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to the following areas and equipment: nomenclature, switches, floodlighting, gages, 
annunciators, caution and warning (C&W) lights, clocks and event t imers,  hand con- 
trollers,  and counters. 
November 19 and 20, 1963. - The MSC Apollo docking interface panel recom- 
mended that the center probe and drogue be considered as the Apollo docking concept 
and that contractor efforts be directed toward the development of this concept. It was 
agreed that the center probe and drogue concept could be developed into a workable 
docking system with a minimum or near-minimum weight penalty, compared to  the 
other six docking systems that had been considered. It was noted that a major con- 
t ractor  effort would be required for  the development and demonstration of a satisfac- 
tory crew transfer capability. 
December 5, 1963. - A special C M  electrical  power system review was conducted 
at  MSC in which the electrical  power system design was  critiqued by astronauts and other 
flightcrew operations personnel. Items discussed included the fuel cell  diver ter  valve 
design, cryogenic heater operation, IFTS philosophy, the feasibility of recharging the 
entry and postlanding batteries, and the provision of an emergency lighting capability. 
1964 
February 13, 1964.- A 4-month study of the Block I CM crew station design was 
completed. The study, conducted by MSC flightcrew operations personnel (including 
astronauts), had been set up under the auspices of the ASP0 in conjunction with vehicle 
contractor logistics and design engineering personnel. The salient review comments 
were as follows. 
1. Consideration should be given to mechanizing abort  functions into a single re- 
movable panel. 
2. The SCS control mode select  panel should be converted to a function select 
panel so the crew could more effectively use the GN&C systems capabilities (e. g., in- 
dividual function switches could permit selection of attitude control modes on a "per 
axis" basis). 
3. The attitude hand controller should be mechanized so  that a soft stop would be 
encountered before actuation of the direct  (hardover) switches. 
4. The flight director attitude indicator (FDAI) attitude presentation should be 
improved by alining the navigation and spacecraft  axes. The attitude e r r o r  and rate 
needles should also be positioned so that their  common neutral position is at the center 
point of the instrument face. 
5. Manual operation of the ECS appears to  be very difficult because of sensor  
locations and the display and control mechanization. 
6. The sequential events lights and override switches should be grouped together 
and arranged according to mission modes; io e., launch escape system abort, high- 
altitude abort, etc. 
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7. The Apollo crew station must be designed with the capability of maintaining 
the crew in space suits, except fo r  short  periods required for  crew body functions, 
until the practicality and safety of shirt-sleeve operations a r e  proved by flight tests. 
March 19, 1964. - The second formal TIM rr?oc,hy review wzs condrictei: zit tile 
contractor's facility. The principal article for inspection and review was the TM- 1 
mockup, which consisted of a full-scale descent stage with landing gear  and an ascent 
stage with a complete interior. The TM-1 mockup reflected improved designs that 
resulted from the earlier M-1 mockup review. 
The objectives of the TM-1 mockup review were as follows. 
1. To inspect, review, and critique the location, shape, arrangement, design, 
and operation of crew/crew- station equipment and interfaces; the location of all anten- 
nas and descent- stage scientific equipment bays; the concept of docking drogue instal- 
lation and storage; and the overall vehicle configuration and arrangement - all for  the 
purpose of establishing a design freeze that would be incorporated into the final mock- 
up (designated M- 5) 
2. To demonstrate four different means of descending from the outside surface 
of the ascent stage to the lunar surface and returning, in a pressurized space suit  and 
in a 1/6-g environment. 
3, To demonstrate mobility, support/restraint, and access  to all i tems in the 
cockpit and equipment tunnel while wearing a space suit (both pressurized and un- 
pressurized) 
4. To demonstrate cockpit floodlighting as proposed fo r  the LM (EL panel light- 
ing would be demonstrated at a later date) 
5. To demonstrate the zem-g foot retention method (shoes with Velcro tape hook 
soles  and floor l ines with Velcro pile) 
First quarter  of 1964. - The Block I1 design of the CSM w 8  initiated. Whereas 
the original CSM (Block I) design had been based on the EOR mode in which no LM was 
used, the Block I1 CSM would be designed to accommodate the LOR technique, which 
used an LM. The basic change between the Block I and I1 designs was  the addition of 
the provision fo r  docking and crew transfer  between the CM and the LM, Design im- 
provement and weight reduction changes were also incorporated at this  time, and the 
philosophy of in-flight maintenance was eliminated in favor of higher reliability re- 
I dundant system s . 
The major  changes included the following. 
i 1. Addition of a docking tunnel and system for docking and crew transfer  between 
vehicles 
2. Addition of an umbilical scheme to temporarily power the LM and for  
spacecraft/LM adapter panel deployment 
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3. Addition of interface hardware to  permit pressurization of the LM by the CM 
4, Internal rearrangement 
5. Addition of EVA capability 
6. Addition of EL lighting and the entry monitor system (EMS) 
7. Addition of the digital autopilot and redundant attitude display 
July 22, 1964. - An interdivision meeting was held at MSC to assess in-house LM 
mockup requirements. As a result  of this meeting, a statement of work was released 
for  the fabrication of the first MSC-based LM mockup. The crew integration mockup 
would be used in crew station geometry studies, crew/equipment integration, prelim- 
inary developmental evaluation of scientific and operational equipment placement, and 
operational problems and crew station familiarization. 
The specific advantages of locating a separate mockup at MSC were (1) the im- 
mediate availability of the device for  performance of its intended functions by engineer- 
ing, training, and flightcrew personnel without extensive t ravel  costs, and (2) the re- 
lease of the LM mockup at the contractor's facility f rom constant reviews, allowing it 
to be more fully used by the contractor as an engineering development tool. 
September 9, 1964.- A working group (CM contractor and MSC) review of the CM 
Block I1 controls and displays was conducted as a forerunner to a Block I1 mockup re- 
view scheduled for  September 30. Recommendations and resul ts  from this meeting 
included the following. 
1. The EMS should be edgelighted rather  than illuminated by the floodlights. 
2. A standard DSKY size was approved. 
3. A manual staging switch was added to panel 19. 
4. Flight control switches were grouped and functionally arranged in  a pr ime 
reach area of the CDR's instrument panel. 
September 10, 1964.- The first CM crew integration systems meeting was held 
at MSC. The agenda i tems included identification and discussion of "open items, I' re- 
view of the Block I1 hand controller configuration and status of the MSC hand controller 
specification, and review of display and control panel arrangement. 
September 10, 1964. - The first spacecraft design integration system meeting was 
held at MSC. Extravehicular crew t ransfer  was a major topic of discussion in regard 
to the rationale fo r  developing design criteria, access hatch design and capabilities, 
and crew-transfer-aids design and capabilities. 
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Third quarter  of 1964.- A major effort was put forth during the third quarter  of 
1964 on the Block I1 CM redesign, with primary emphasis on the GN&C system and as- 
sociated controls and displays. Major changes and events included the following. 
1. Numerous CNRrC system switching functims were moved to the coiiii.ui panei. 
2. The inertial  measuring unit and the FDAI were realined to correspond to the 
vehicle body axes. 
3. A second FDAI was added, 
4. One translational controller was deleted (equivalent redundancy would be built 
into the remaining controller). 
5. The MSC attitude controller functional specification f o r  the CM and LM was 
finalized. 
6. The EMS configuration was  established. 
7. A Block I CM crew compartment lighting review was conducted in a mockup 
at the CM contractor's facility. The concept was considered adequate for  Block I, with 
a few changes. 
8. The unitized couch concept was discussed at MSC. The main advantages were 
reductions in weight and volume. 
9, The CM crew restraint  system and lateral hatch mockup were evaluated and 
found acceptable with minor changes (shoulder harness needed stiffer webbing). 
Major changes and events relative to  the LM included the following. 
1, An EL lighting review was conducted in the TM-1 mockup. The concept was 
found to  be acceptable. 
2. An extensive review of the timing requirements fo r  the Apollo mission was 
conducted by MSC. 
3. An MSC study identified an operational requirement fo r  continuous monitoring 
of descent propellant quantity, as opposed to the current  configuration of a low-level 
discrete. 
4. An overhead window was implemented for the LM CDR, and the forward dock- 
ing tunnel was deleted. 
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5. The basic ground rules  fo r  man's role  in the LM were restated fo r  the benefit 
of the G&N redefinition program. 
a. Man should be an integral par t  of the loop, not a passive monitor. 
b. Vehicle control should be fully automatic or fully manual fo r  higher per- 
f ormance and safety: automatic fo r  high- accuracy, rapid- response, repetitious, and 
predictable tasks; manual for  nonroutine maneuvers, flexibility, judgment, complex 
logic, and transition between modes. 
October 5 to 8, 1964.- The third official LM mockup review was conducted at the 
contractor's facility. The principal art icle for  inspection and review was the M- 5 
mockup, a full- scale metal mockup (previous mockups were wood) that represented 
complete interior and exterior arrangements. The M-5 was the last in the series of 
mockups fabricated by the vehicle contractor fo r  the purpose of establishing the LM 
configuration. Additional i tems presented f o r  review were "hard" mockups of equip- 
ment, engines, the RCS, antennas, system and subsystem components, and s t ructure  
and line runs. Demonstrations were also included of the external mobility techniques 
of descending to and ascending from the lunar surface and of the internal mobility tasks  
in the cockpit while wearing a space suit, both pressurized and unpressurized, 
The principal objectives of the M- 5 inspection and review were to definitize the 
LM configuration for  continued development and qualification and t o  establish the con- 
figuration as the basis for  tooling and fabrication of initial LM end-items. 
A total of 148 requests fo r  action was submitted during the review. The signifi- 
cant results were as follows. 
1, Crew provisions: Crew provisions were acceptable in concept in almost all 
cases and in the method of implementation in a majority of cases. Discrepancies in- 
cluded the following items, 
a. Shoe height adjustment was found unnecessary. 
b. Armres ts  were too restrictive and cumbersome. 
c. The controller/armrest  geometry was undesirable. 
d. The PLSS donning and recharge stations required further refinement. 
e. Lithium hydroxide (LiOH) stowage containers required rework. 
f. Stowage provisions did not exist  for  the flight data file. 
g. Lunar egress  equipment (tunnel, handgrips and handles, and ladder) re- 
quired refinement. 
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2. Displays and controls: Displays and controls were generally acceptable. Dis- 
crepancies included the following items. 
a, The thrust-to- weight indicator needed relocating to permit viewing from 
both stations. 
b. Certain panel nomenclature was found to be inconsistent with accepted CM 
panel nomenclature (e. g., left and right instead of Ityaw). 
c. The X- and Y-mark buttons required relocating from the DSKY to the AOT 
for  adequate access. 
3, Lighting: The lighting was judged to  range from generally good to excellent 
with the exception of the dome/lunar excursion light. The dual function gf a single 
light was rejected; separate  units would be provided instead. 
November 13, 1964. - The existing DSKY design for  the Block I1 CSM and fo r  the 
LM was found to  be incompatible with the existing display panel design of both vehicles 
from the standpoint of lighting, nomenclature presentation, and caution/warning philos- 
ophy. To ensure compatibility and consistency with existing spacecraft display panel 
design, MSC established the following mandatory operational requirements fo r  design 
of the DSKY. 
1, All caution lights on the DSKY were to be gated into the pr imary  guidance and 
navigation system (PGNS) caution light on the main instrument panels of both vehicles 
and into the PGNS caution light on the LEB panel of the CM. Furthermore,  any caution 
signal gated into the mas ter  PGNS caution light should appear as an individual caution 
light on the DSKY, Warning lights would not be displayed on the DSKY, but warning 
signals would be gated into the appropriate fail lights located on the main instrument 
panels and in the LEB. 
2. Definitions, method of display, design philosophies, nomenclature, and light- 
ing were t o  be functionally compatible with both the CM and LM and were to conform to  
pending interface control documents. 
January 1965. - An LM spacecraft/crew interface reduced-gravity test plan was 
prepared by the LM contractor. The following revisions were recommended by MSC. 1 
1. Flight control studies should not be conducted because Mercury experience 
has shown that such tes t s  of limited duration prove inconclusive. 
2. Tes t  subjects should be NASA and LM contractor personnel and should be 
supported by NASA medical and suit technicians. 
3. All equipment being evaluated or being used in  conjunction with a particular 
test shall  be spacecraft  prototype or  production hardware directly applicable t o  the LM 
program. 
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4. Reduced-gravity tests should not be used to  establish design c r i te r ia  but to  
verify design of prototype hardware. 
It was decided that numerous controls and displays identified as common-usage 
hardware should be declassified as such and that the vehicle contractors should instead 
pursue independent procurements. The two major stumbling blocks to  common usage 
were environmental requirements and schedules. Environmental requirements differed 
between the two vehicles. The requirements were more severe for  the LM but did not 
cover the entire test  range for  the CM. To provide a common environment with respect 
to vibration, it would be necessary for  MSC to establish this common spectrum and im- 
pose it upon the major contractors where applicable. This action would result  in a slip 
in hardware de livery schedules . 
February 1965. - It was  concluded at MSC that an identical display technique 
should be used for fuel and oxidizer quantities in both the LM and the CM. It was also 
recommended that all propulsion quantities be displayed in percent of quantity remain- 
ing. It was believed that standardization in this a r ea  would significantly enhance in- 
flight propellant monitoring techniques. 
May 10, 1965. - An alternate approach to the standard "two out of three" failure 
logic was established for  Apollo telemetry measurements. Where cri t ical  operational 
decisions must be based on noncorrelatable parameters,  dual (not triple) redundant 
sensing and telemetry measurements would be provided. The rationale for  two sensors  
(not three) is as follows. 
1. If both sensors  read within (or beyond) operating limits, the measurements 
are considered to be valid and the parameter status is considered to be satisfactory 
(or unsatisfactory). 
2. If one sensor reads within limits and the other indicates a failure, the satis- 
factory measurement is considered to  be valid and the indicated failure is considered 
to  be invalid. (For the failure indication to  be valid, not only must the system have 
failed but a sensor must correspondingly fail to  show a satisfactory reading. This 
occurrence is considered to  be of far lower probability than a single instrumentation 
failure. ) 
June/July 1965. - Zero- and lunar-gravity flight tes t s  were conducted in a KC-135 
aircraf t  to  evaluate crew mobility in the cockpit/cabin configuration of the LM vehicle. 
All tasks  were performed without the use of a restraint  system. Handgrips and the 
adhesion between Velcro shoes and the Velcro-covered cabin floor were the sole means 
of restraint  during the weightless state. These tes t s  (1) certified the accessibility of 
LM controls, (2) identified the maximum acceptable operating torque for  ECS valves, 
(3) demonstrated that an environment of weightlessness or lunar gravity may enhance 
rather than deter several  of the tasks  required during a lunar mission, (4) demonstrated 
the need for additional handholds to  assist in manipulation of the overhead hatch and 
other operations, (5) identified the need to redesign the LiOH canister knob handle to  
accommodate manipulation with a "gloved" hand, and (6) illustrated the need f o r  im- 
proved restraint of the crew and crew station equipment. 
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July 5 to 9, 1965.- The fourth in a ser ies  of LM crew integration meetings was 
held at the LM contractor's facility. The objectives of the meeting were to review and 
provide an  up-to-date summary of the design and development of the LM crew station 
that had occurred since the M-5 mockup review. Items covered in this meeting in- 
cluded the restraint system, flight kit, helmet ZK! vixIc*:: filters, szientiiie m d  crew 
equipment stowage, lighting, optical aids, and controls and displays. 
The salient conclusions and resul ts  were a s  follows. 
1. LM restraint  system: The current design concc pt of the support and restraint  
system was judged acceptable on the basis of the resul ts  of ongoing development tests. 
(Absolute confirmation would be obtained by manned drop tests with LM test ar t ic le  3 
(LTA-3)). 
2. Scientific and crew equipment stowage: Action i tems were assigned to re- 
solve operational requirements and stowage for  sequence cameras,  in-flight tools, EVA 
visors, sample return containers, television camera cabling (for operation through the 
overhead hatch), and the external portable light. 
3, Landing and docking aids: The MSC proposed that a collimated reticle device 
be added t o  the overhead window to  aid docking operations. 
4. Controls and displays: The MSC evidenced some concern f o r  the readability 
of a 60-hour clockface proposed fo r  the LM and the possibility of e r r o r  in performing 
the synchronizing operations during the mission, The desirability of changing the 
range of the digital event t imer  f rom 99 minutes 59 seconds to 59 minutes 59 seconds 
was also discussed. The MSC accepted an action item to  investigate the need fo r  the 
LGC uplink switch and light. The LM contractor indicated that descent propellant 
quantity gaging was being incorporated, 
September 1965. - A %-year program of LM approach-and-landing simulations by 
MSC was completed. The study was conducted to develop GN&C hardware and pilot 
techniques to support a lunar landing, These simulations (1) validated the LM touch- 
down velocity criteria fo r  the LM to be vithin pilot control capabilities, (2) demon- 
strated a strong pilot preference for  manual descent engine cutoff, (3) invalidated the 
use of a digital FDA1 because of a lack of trend information, (4) identified a require- 
ment to  relocate the descent engine stop switch for  improved access, (5) demonstrated 
the inadequacy of using the CM Block I attitude hand controller within the LM (low- 
force gradients caused cross-coupling between axes), and (6) demonstrated the effect 
of pressure  suit operations on pilotage techniques and display and control design. 
Third quarter  of 1965. - Interface control documents that addressed both physical 
and functional interfaces that existed between the main hardware suppliers were among 
the numerous crew station documents that were completed and signed off. The "CM- 
LM Transferable Equipment" interface control document, for  example, established 
specific technical requirements for  each item of equipment to be t ransferred between 
the CM arid the LM; defined the t ransfer  requirements; and referenced the documents 
that  controlled the size, shape, weight, stowage locations, and mounting provisions 
f o r  i tems of transferable equipment. Interface control documents were a1s.o generated 
fo r  displays; controls; nomenclature, markings, and color; and lighting. 
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October 14, 1965.- Stowage of equipment in the Apollo spacecraft  and the need 
f o r  mockups were reexamined at MSC. It was noted that, under present plans, 2 full 
years  would elapse between the last Block I mockup update and review and the flight of 
spacecraft (SC) 012. Since that mockup review, there  had been numerous design 
changes to the crew compartment, which had not been physically inspected fo r  the ef- 
fect or  suitability of the change. In addition, little operational gear  and no scientific 
equipment had been integrated into the spacecraft. To remedy this  situation, the fol- 
lowing recommendations were made. 
1. The vehicle contractors and MSC should maintain mockups that represent the 
precise  interior configuration of the spacecraft and in which all necessary stowage ex- 
ercises can be performed and demonstrated. 
2. A series of activities should be instituted in which the contractors develop 
the integrated stowage; MSC then inspects and approves, and, following approval, the 
contractor's mockup undergoes change control to the next succeeding spacecraft. 
3. The MSC mockups should be maintained in the configuration approved at the 
t ime of the review of the contractor's mockup. As other problems develop during train- 
ing on this unit, o r  during further studies of the activity for  the mission, the approved 
configuration should be a suitable baseline for  making adjustments to the spacecraft as 
required. 
1966 
January 7 and 10, 1966,- An LM crew mobility review was conducted in the LM 
mockup at MSC. The purpose of the review was to  evaluate crew tasks and equipment 
before the forthcoming LM crit ical  design review. Four astronauts and three contractor 
employees served as test subjects. Thirty-eight review item dispositions (RID'S) were 
generated, which resulted in a variety of action i tems such as 
1. Evaluation of t ransfer  procedures under weightless conditions in a KC- 135 
aircraft 
2. Further examination of the use of television through the top hatch 
3. Provision fo r  external handholds near the front hatch to aid in egress/ ingress  
4, Provision fo r  certain equipment with additional protection against possible 
contact and damage 
First quarter of 1966. - A three-phase cr i t ical  design review was conducted f o r  
LTA- 8 (the thermal-vacuum test vehicle), LM- 1 (originally planned as the first manned 
vehicle), and LM- 4 (originally planned as the first lunar-landing vehicle). The pr imary  
objective of the review was contractor/MSC agreement on the acceptability of the design 
for  fabrication. 
The first phase of the review was conducted at MSC, and the second pliase was 
conducted at the contractor's facility. The pr ime requisite f o r  the first two phases was 
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satisfaction of the technical requirements established by the LM master  end- item speci- 
fication as they applied to the LM-4 vehicle. The third phase, a lso conducted at the 
contractor's facility, was dedicated to the acceptability of the vehicle in regard to ve- 
hicle and mission operations. 
The following is a summary of actions that affected LM crew station design and 
ope rations. 
1. Crew compartment design: Eight requests for  changes (RFC) were approved 
that required hardware changes such as the addition of ceiling covers to protect wiring 
and prevent debris from collecting in this area and the addition of more Velcro to  aid 
in equipment handling and stowage. 
2. Crew station operations: Eleven RFC's were approved. All required various 
studies, and most resulted in procedures o r  hardware modifications. One study changed 
the method and hardware for  the deployment of the very-high-frequency (vhf) EVA an- 
tenna (manual assembly by an astronaut standing in  the top hatch was changed to semi- 
automatic erection by actuation of a crew compartment control). Another study pro- 
duced methods for  in-flight checkout of the entire C&W system. 
3, Displays and controls: Twenty RFC's were approved, 10 of which required 
hardware changes (e. g., a PGNS minimum-impulse mode was added f o r  fine attitude 
maneuvers). The remaining 10 RFC's required various studies, some of which re- 
sulted in hardware modifications (e. g., one study identified the need to provide indi- 
vidual heater controls for  RCS thruster  quads), 
4. Lighting: Two RFC's were approved and required hardware changes. Indi- 
vidual continuous dimming of the forward floodlights would be implemented, and the 
location, color, and intensity of the lunar contact light would be improved. A study 
was also commissioned t o  examine the need for window shades to aid in crew station 
temperature control. 
May 18, 1966. - The CSM SC-014 critical design review was conducted at the con- 
t ractor 's  facility. Spacecraft 014 was planned to be the second manned Block I space- 
craft. Approximately 50 RID's were dispositioned, 30 of which required hardware 
changes, 
and therefore  did not require action by the vehicle contractor. Most of the RID's were 
made retroactive t o  SC-012, the first manned CM. 
The remaining RID'S were primarily addressed to discrepancies with GFE 
The following is a sampling of RID's that were approved for  implementation. 
1. Improve design, construction, and fit of the weightless res t ra int  crewman 
sandals . 
2, Protect  wiring bundles f rom traffic. 
3, Redesign cam lock fasteners  on the right-hand auxiliary food box for  proper 
functioning. 
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4. Rotate penlights in  stowage compartment to permit detection of inadvertently 
actuated lights. 
5. Provide more Velcro stowage and restraining areas on aft bulkhead. 
6. Provide a spare  COAS light bulb. 
7. Color-code crew/day food packages (nine man-meals) and incorporate a 
lanyarding scheme such that 1 day's supply of food (for three crewmen) may be identi- 
fied and removed from the stowage containers each day. 
November 1966. - Procedures for  maintaining stowage lists were established. 
The first official stowage list was to be issued by the CM vehicle contractor and sub- 
mitted for  NASA approval. Subsequent revisions to this list (for each spacecraft) were 
to  be forwarded to the vehicle contractor f rom NASA according to the following sched- 
ule. 
1. Three weeks before stowage review 
2. One month before the CCFF test 
3. One week before the manned altitude chamber run at KSC 
4. Before the flight for  documentation of launch configuration 
5. A s  necessary to  incorporate significant changes 
Block I1 stowage lists issued by the NASA FCST's would consist of five parts:  a CM 
launch stowage list, an LM launch stowage list, a CM-LM transfer  list, an  LM-CM 
transfer  list, and a CM entry list. 
1967 
February/March 1967, - As a result  of the SC-012 fire, a series of CSM Block I1 
and LM design redefinition reviews was conducted at MSC. Approximately 100 design 
and procedural changes were proposed for  each vehicle, Most of the proposed changes 
were subsequently implemented. 
Changes proposed for  the CSM included redesigning plumbing lines and shields, 
implementing a rapid repressurization scneme, relocating the ECS controls, using air 
f o r  pad operations, providing a ''folddown" mechanism for  the rotational controllers, 
adding a CSM tracking light, implementing nonmetallic mater ia ls  cri teria,  implement- 
.* a unified hatch, providing an emergency oxygen mask, and implementing design 
improvements for  the existing crew couch and developing a foldable couch f o r  later 
vehicles. 
Changes proposed for  the LM included providing power-down capability f o r  all 
connectors mated/demated during flight operations, deleting single-point failures within 
vehicle subsystems, providing a method f o r  verification/adjustment of the LM COAS/CM 
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docking target alinement, providing integral restraints (instead of special connections) 
for  oxygen hoses, providing a crew station fire-extinguishing device for  the pad and for  
in-flight use, providing protection f o r  the remaining crewman in the event of catastroph- 
ic damage to  the suit of one crewman, providing the capability for  continuous S- band 
communications during all lunar ~perz t t i~ns  within the h e  of sigh1 of tie Earth inde- 
pendent of pilot maneuvers, providing switch isolation of each attitude and thrust/  
translation hand controller, and providing scale sensitivity selection for  the FDA1 
rate needles. 
Second quarter of 1967.- A s  a result  of the reviews held after the SC-012 f i re ,  
numerous design and procedural changes were instituted. Changes instituted for  - 
the CM crew station a r e  summarized as follows. 
1. Cabin materials:  An improved materials selection and substitution program 
was established. The major bulk combustibles in the cabin were removed, and sub- 
stitutes were evaluated. 
2. Space- suit materials:  State- of-the-art nonflammable fabrics, having 10 t imes 
the f i r e  resistance of former materials, were incorporated into an integral cover layer  
for  the space suit. 
3, Side hatch: A unified, outward-opening, quick- release side hatch replaced the 
separate  pressure  and heat shield hatch. Essential features of the new hatch were man- 
ual release for  normal o r  high internal pressures,  operation either internally or ex- 
ternally, and manual operation for  protection against inadvertent opening. 
4. Cabin atmosphere: The option would be provided to  use either air o r  100 per- 
cent oxygen f o r  ground tests,  prelaunch and launch. The final atmosphere would be 
determined from ongoing boilerplate fire-safety tests. 
5. Equipment protection: Protective covers were added to exposed oxygen and 
glycol plumbing lines and electrical wiring. 
6. Fire protection: An emergency breathing mask system was provided to permit 
crew operations if a cabin f i r e  occurred during shirt-sleeve operations. An ad&&i6fial 
p ressure  relief valve and a second oxygen surge tank were added to  permit rapid de- 
pressurization and repressurization, respectively. 
y 4 '  - ,  
7. Fire extinguishment: A portable, crew- operated fire extinguisher, which con- 
sisted of a special hose and nozzle connected to the spacecraft water supply, was  de- 
veloped. 
The following additional changes were also approved for  ine&&OmkdF&o'the CSM 
&&" b - ...&.-a+f---? 
.w: x- j 
design. I 4. .  r,' - 
1. Certain ECS controls were relocated to facilitate emergency operations. 
2. A manual lockout was provided for  the postlanding vent valve to preclude ac- 
cidental decompression. 
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3. An automatic battery bus tie upon abort  initiation was implemented to  reduce 
crew load at this time. 
4. The hand-controller 1. 7-second t imer  was replaced with a 3-second t imer  
f o r  subsequent operations with the LM. 
5. Minor changes were made f o r  improved crew couch operations, and the couch 
J-box was relocated to  prevent wiring damage. 
6. Redundant power was provided to the S-band system, and 17 new measure- 
ments were added to the operational instrumentation system. 
July 13 to 18, 1967.- Joint CM contractor/NASA discussions were held at the 
contractor's facility on the proposed delivered configuration of CM mockups MSC 1 and 
2 and the KSC egress  t ra iner  (KSC-E) as well as the maintained configuration of mock- 
up 28 at the contractor's facility. The purpose of the meeting was to discuss mockup 
configuration requirements and to  agree on the configuration details and the level of 
fidelity in the following major areas:  electrical  equipment, GFE provisions, side ac- 
cess hatches, docking tunnels, main display and control panels, oxygen umbilicals, 
and EVA provisions. It was established that the mockups would correspond to  the fol- 
lowing initial spacecraft configurations: 
1. MSC- 1: SC- 101 configuration (subsequently SC- 104, SC- 106, etc. ) 
2. MSC-2: SC- 103 configuration (subsequently SC- 105, SC- 107, etc. ) 
3. KSC-E: SC-101 configuration 
4. Mockup 28: SC- f04 configuration (subsequently SC- 105, SC- 106, etc. ) 
Mockup 28 would continue to  be used for conceptual design studies and preliminary de- 
sign reviews until it was  scheduled for the SC- 104 configuration update. 
August 26, 1967.- The top management at MSC conducted a review of CM stowed 
The status, configuration, and composition of both equipment and stowage provisions. 
contractor-furnished equipment (CFE) and GFE were reviewed. The following mate- 
rials and test cr i ter ia  were established. 
1. Materials that burn will be replaced with nonflammable material. 
2. Where materials cannot be changed o r  reliability would be degraded by the 
change, flammable materials may be used in the spacecraft. 
In such instances, they will not be located near ignition sources  and will be placed in  
Beta-cloth bags or metal containers. New mater ia ls  will continue to be evaluated and 
will be phased into the program i f  found to  be acceptable. 
3. Off-limits material  flammability tes t s  will be accomplished to determine the 
acceptability of materials . 
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4. Qualification tes t s  will be done using ignition sources  that would actually 
exist in  the spacecraft. 
5. The high-fidelity CSM mockup would be used for  demonstration tests using 
ignition sources  that exist in  the spacecraft. 
fidelity boilerplate to acquire ear l ie r  data on the acceptability of material  changes. 
Certain idem-s would be added te the !cw- 
August 1967. - At the request of MSC, the CM and LM contractors prepared docu- 
ments fo r  their  respective vehicles that standardized all crew station displays and con- 
t ro l s  nomenclature. The pr imary  purpose of these nomenclature listings was to elim- 
inate confusion by technicians, test engineers, o r  flightcrews when performing ac- 
ceptance, checkout, o r  operational flight procedures. Nomenclature within the stand- 
a rd  listings conformed to  general rules established by MSC (e. g., 'When a switch does 
not have a unique title, the shared title and the upper switch position shall be used to 
identify the switch. "). 
September 11, 1967. - A review of the displays and controls configuration and of 
outstanding problems for  the CM thermal-vacuum test vehicle (2TV- 1) and SC- 101 was 
conducted at the contractor's facility. Subjects discussed included nomenclature er-  
rors; nonfunctional controls; guards for  the CMC/gyro display coupler (GDC), RCS 
purge, and sequential events switches; EVA assist ba r s  and panel protective grills; 
C&W limits and changes; power interface of the launch vehicle tank pressure/engine 
gimbal position meters;  certain crew station color/marking discrepancies; and dim- 
ming requirements for  the docking target. The numerous e r r o r s  and inconsistencies 
in panel nomenclature and markings identified at the review resulted from an MSC 
cross-  check of display and control layout drawings, individual panel drawings, and EL 
specification control drawings. 
September 1967. - A prototype combined protective grid and ingress handrail for  
the center portion of the CM MDC was evaluated by astronauts and flightcrew engineers 
on KC-135 zero-g flights. It was concluded that a protective grid would only be re- 
quired f o r  Apollo flights involving planned EVA with CM ingress.  It was also concluded 
that the final protective grid should be (1) attachable in  flight, (2) stowable in the LM o r  
CM until needed, and (3) jettisonable f rom the CM after the last CM ingress  is per- 
formed. It was recommended that redesigned guards should be fur ther  evaluated in the 
new WIF tank at MSC. 
October 10 to  12, 1967. - A delta critical design review of the first manned Block 
I1 CM (SC- 101) was conducted. Measurement change requests and associated documen- 
tation were reviewed by contractor/NASA teams to  ensure design compliance with NASA 
RID'S affecting crew station design and operations included the following. 
I 
I contractual directives resulting from postfire redesign efforts. Actions assigned to 30 
1. NASA will provide the foot res t ra int  requirements. I I 
2. The contractor will provide revised SC- 101 stowage drawings. 
3. The contractor will provide data on the unified hatch design. 
4. The contractor will submit a nonmetallic- mater ia ls  control and verification 
plan. 
I 43 I 
October 13, 1967. - The first Apollo configuration control board meeting was con- 
ducted by MSC. Ground rules for  approving changes and conducting subsequent meet- 
ings were established. Several material  deviations were approved, including the use of 
existing space- suit oxygen umbilicals made of silicon rubber because the substitution of 
other materials was not feasible. A review of all CM and LM stowed equipment was 
conducted. It was  decided that the vehicle contractors would be directed to  prepare 
crew station Velcro control drawings that would i l lustrate all pile and hook Velcro lo- 
cations within the spacecraft. The total quantity and weight of the Velcro would be 
limited. A change to disable the PGNS caution light within both vehicles was also ap- 
proved. (During crew training, flightcrews were annoyed with constant insignificant 
activations of the PGNS light, which in turn tr iggered the master  a la rm light and a la rm 
tone with each activation. ) 
December 18 and 19, 1967. - The second in a series of Apollo foldable crew couch 
reviews was conducted; 13 RID'S were generated. Five action i tems accepted by NASA 
included (1) providing direction to meet the requirement for  retention of the crew couch 
suit pan i n  the 170" position (to aid in tunnel/G&N station operations) and (2) defining 
the length of the crew couch calf pan required to maintain suitable back-thigh angles 
(existing 33- centimeter (13 inch)/lO-percentile length would not accommodate smaller  
and larger  astronauts). In conjunction with the foldable- couch review, several  i tems 
stemming from ear l ie r  exercises  were evaluated with the following results. 
1. A 7.6-centimeter (3 inch) handle extension was judged to be required for  ac- 
cess  to  the cabin pressure  dump valves. 
2. The relocated position of the spacecraft cabin gas analyzer was judged to  be 
acceptable, 
3. Access t o  the cabin repressurization control was judged to be acceptable. 
4. The new L-shaped PGA stowage bag w a s  assessed and approved. 
December 1967.- In response to an RID submitted at the phase I customer ac- 
ceptance readiness review (CARR) for  CM SC-101, a set of display and control panel 
closeout photographs was submitted by the contractor t o  NASA for  review. Numerous 
nomenclature discrepancies were found and identified to the vehicle contractor fo r  cor- 
rective action. Discrepancies included the following: 
1. The vhf antenna knob covered adjacent nomenclature. 
2. The COAS power receptacle nomenclature was missing. 
3. Certain nomenclature brackets were missing. 
4. Nomenclature for  the postlanding ventilation control was missing. 
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1968 
February 9, 1968. - A nonmetallic- materials requirements document was re- 
leased by MSC. The purpose of this document was to establish nonmetallic materials 
se!eztisn and acceptance guidelines and to tes t  requirements for control of flammability 
and toxicity of nonmetallic materials used in  the Apollo spacecraft and in applicable 
test equipment used internal to  the Apollo spacecraft during closed-hatch testing. 
Guidelines concerning control and verification of material  and assembly flammability 
and toxicity were based on the following requirements. 
1. Reduction in the probability of ignition 
2. Restriction of any fire to a definable a rea  
3. Limitation of the rate and magnitude of the r i se  of temperature and pressure 
f rom any fire to  prevent the loss  of structural  integrity 
4. Protection of the crew from the flammability and toxicity effects caused by 
any fire 
5. Implementation of design features concerned with controlling flame propaga- 
tion and the effects of any fire 
Materials were classified and treated as seven different categories. 
1. Category A - Major exposed materials 
2. Category B - Special applications and minor exposed materials 
3. Category C - Crew oxygen supply materials 
4. Category E - Material applications in sealed containers 
5. Category F - Materials in vented containers 
6. Category G - Materials applications in  nonflight equipment 
7. Category H - Materials in uninhabited portions of the spacecraft 
March 1, 1968. - A spacecraft/crew integration plan for  manned Block I1 Apollo 
CSM and LM missions was released at MSC. As with the previously released Block I 
CSM plan, this plan defined the specific participation by the pr imary and backup flight- 
crews and the FCST in the Apollo spacecraft reviews, spacecraft checkout testing, and 
prelaunch operations. One significant revision made to the la ter  plan was the addition 
of a second CCFF test  for  the CM. The second CCFF test  was to  be held at KSC and 
would verify unsuited- crewman emergency egress procedures in a pressurized and 
unp re s surized cabin, ac  ce s s ibilit y, proper mechanical and electrical  functions, opera- 
tional suitability of all stowed and installed crew equipment for  in-flight use, and re- 
entry locations (with the crewmen suited and unsuited). 
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March 18 to 20, 1968.- Phases I and I1 of the LM-4 CARR were conducted. A 
photographic review of the crew station configuration resulted in the identification of 
numerous panel nomenclature discrepancies. Several panel hardware discrepancies 
were also detected during an  "in the vehicle" review. A request for  action was  also 
submitted that recommended providing an extra  circuit breaker to prevent a single- 
point failure that would disable all LM crew station floodlighting. The vehicle con- 
t ractor  subsequently corrected the discrepancies identified. 
March 22, 1968. - A mockup utilization plan was released at MSC that established 
the preparation of mockup utilization request forms and Annual milestone projection 
forms by organizations planning exercises in MSC CM and LM mockups. 
were to be used to maintain a mas ter  schedule for  all mockups. In the event of con- 
flicting mockup utilization requirements, availability would be based on the following 
priorit ies:  
These forms  
1. Mission- cri t ical  requirements 
2. Crew training 
3. Procedures development 
4. Hardware development and evaluation 
5. Mainline Apollo but non- mission- related studies 
6. Future programs 
The plan controlled the use of all 14 vehicle mockups maintained by MSC, which in- 
cluded the one-g static mockups (2 CM, 2 LM), the KC-135 zero-g mockups (1 CM, 
2 LM), the KSC-E CM mockup, the neutral-buoyancy mockups (1 CM, 1 LM), the CM- 
LM EVA trail mockup, the CM- LM tunnel mockup, the KC- 135/neutral- buoyancy LM 
ingress/egress mockup, and the simulated lunar surface LM mockup. 
March 25 and 28, 1968. - Protective handrails for the CM MDC were evaluated in 
the MSC WIF. Procedures and equipment for  oxygenpurge system (OPS) ingress,  PLSS/ 
OPS ingress/egress, and hatch closing were also evaluated. A s  a result, it w a s  recom- 
mended that the handrail configuration used in this tes t  be implemented for  the CM. 
March 1968. - A review was made of all LM equipment and systems with the in- 
tent of reducing inert  weight. Most of the changes proposed for  the crew station were 
not implemented because of their  effect on mission success  and crew safety. Proposed 
changes included deletion of the television camera system, deletion of the orbital rate 
drive, eartn and lunar (ORDEAL), deletion of one of tile two PDAI's, elimindtion of 
one or  botn utility lignts, and modifications to tne crew station cable run (approved). 
A crew procedures control plan was established at MSC. The plan specified 
methods that were to be used t o  control flightcrew procedures delineated within the 
Apollo f l ight  plans and procedures documents, including systems procedures within the 
AOH; flight procedures documents; and EVA, lunar surface,  and photographic proce- 
dures  documents. The definition and character is t ics  of two types of crew procedures 
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were included in the plan. System procedures were defined as the sequence of crew 
actions necessary to operate a spacecraft system. Flight procedures were defined as 
the time history of crew actions necessary to achieve a mission objective. 
April 22 to 2Gj  1968, - The LM-3 (first mar ied  LX) crew station procedures and 
LM lunar surface tasks  were exercised on KC-135 reduced-gravity flights. Crew 
equipment and procedural comments included the following. 
1. A more positive method of securing the helmet stowage bags to the ascent 
engine cover may be required. 
2. Donning/doffing of the PLSS could best be accomplished without any restraints  
attached to the crewman being outfitted. 
3. The descent- stage equipment deployment mechanism should be redesigned. 
Replacement of the deployment handle with a D-ring hooked to  a cable-type actuator was 
suggested. 
April 1968. - Photographic documentation requirements were revised for  the CM 
and LM spacecraft. Whereas the earlier plan required the contractors to "photograph 
the standard configuration of one typical spacecraft through all stages of manufactur- 
ing, '' the revised plan required that all vehicles be photographed. Spacecraft manag- 
ers and assigned flightcrews were to  be furnished a complete set  of display and control 
panel photographs, and project engineering would be supplied with a set of crew equip- 
ment photographs. 
May 21, 1968. - The CSM contractor generated a plan to resolve a recurr ing 
problem of discrepancies in crew station display and control and ECS placarded nomen- 
clature. Highlights of the plan were an engineering review of all applicable drawings, 
a manufacturing review of drawings and panels, quality control checks before panel as- 
sembly, and establishment of change verification record books for  use in the installa- 
tion area to document all open work t o  be performed on display and control panels and 
black boxes. 
May 22, 1968. - The MSC directed the CM vehicle contractor to terminate the 
preparation of standard aircraft-type crew checklists for  each vehicle. Instead, the 
checklists would be prepared and maintained by MSC personnel and reviewed by the 
contractor. This was believed to  be a more effective approach toward integrating the 
checklist with other mission- related documents being maintained at MSC. 
June 1968. - The CM (vehicle 2TV-1) thermal-vacuum test was conducted at MSC. 
The flightcrew and FCST made numerous recommendations in those areas where it was 
considered that a technical or procedural change would result in safer o r  more  effec- 
tive future thermal-vacuum testing and/or vehicle flight. Recommendations germane to 
crew station design and operations were implemented and included the following. 
1. Investigate the possibility of changing the design o r  location of the cabin mir- 
ror assemblies  to  provide greater  visual coverage. 
2. Change the location of the television camera to reduce interference with crew 
activity and provide a satisfactory clamping device. 
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3. Resolve the deficiencies reported with stowage volumes (stuck doors, inter- 
ference,  and distortion). 
4. Investigate the possibility of providing in-flight pens that would write satis- 
factorily on Nomex paper. 
5. Assure proper fit of window shades on each vehicle. 
6. Add screwdrivers (flat and cross-point), small pliers,  spare  B-nut wrench, 
and small  crescent wrench to the toolkit fo r  use in making onboard repairs  and adjust- 
ments. 
7. Provide onboard procedures for  use  of emergency oxygen masks. 
September 5, 1968. - Flightcrew support teams were assigned to  provide support 
fo r  the first five Apollo missions, which would use the following vehicles, respective- 
ly: CSM-101, CSM- 103, CSM-104/LM-3, CSM-106/LM-4, and CSM- 107/LM- 5. The 
FCST's were to provide the flightcrew support functions enumerated in the spacecraft/ 
crew integration plan fo r  manned Block I1 Apollo CSM and LM missions and were to  
supplement the role of the crew station subsystem managers on their  assigned space- 
craft. As defined in the integration plan, each FCST consisted of a team leader, crew 
station engineers, crew equipment engineers, spacecraft  systems engineers, and a 
training coordinator. 
October 11 to 22, 1968. - The first manned Apollo flight was accomplished. This 
mission qualified the CSM for  operation in the Earth-orbital environment and demon- 
strated its readiness for  flight tests in the cislunar and lunar-orbital environments. 
The Apollo 7 flightcrew found that the C M  crew station was adequately configured fo r  
the mission and presented no compromise to  performance of their  required duties. Six 
crew station anomalies were experienced - four display and control items, one lighting 
anomaly, and a window contamination problem. 
December 21 to 27, 1968. - The second manned Apollo flight was conducted. 
Apollo 8, the first manned lunar orbit mission, qualified the CSM systems fo r  manned 
lunar flight. Relatively few problems were encountered in regard to crew station de- 
sign and operations. Equipment stowage, displays and controls, and lighting were 
found to be adequate. Three crew station anomalies were experienced - EMS abnormal 
indications, excessive noise emissions f rom cabin fans, and window contamination. 
1969 
January 21, 1969. - The first Apollo 11 FCST meeting was held at KSC. Action 
i tems resulting from the meeting included the following. 
1. Investigate the fidelity of the LM descent- stage training equipment. 
2. Investigate PLSS checkout requirements in the altitude chamber. 
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3. Schedule probe/drogue and vehicle emergency egress  training exercises. 
4. Prepare  for  an upcoming LM and CM crew equipment bench check. 
February 6 and ?, 1969.- The first liiiiar ianding mission/’Apollo 11 prime and 
bacKup crews  participated in a bencn review of flightcrew equipment at  KSC. 
Deficiencies/discrepancies that were noted included tne following items. 
1. CSM-107: 
a. Crew equipment shortages included 23 GFE items and 17 CFE items. 
b. Urine hose needs to be lengthened so  that it will reach under the cabin 
pressure  relief valve. 
c. An alinement mark  is needed on the television camera fo r  cable attach- 
ment. 
d. A sextant adapter must be provided for the 16-millimeter camera  to sat- 
isfy the requirement to  photograph the LM on the lunar surface. 
e. Tape recorder  and spotmeter a r e  too loose in the stowage cushions. 
2. LM-5 ascent stage: 
a. Crew equipment shortages included 15  GFE items and 6 CFE items. 
b. The lunar overshoes were improperly marked. 
c. The COAS lens needs cleaning. 
d. The PLSS hose fittings were improperly color coded. 
e. 
needs to  be defined. 
The stowage location of the PLSS remote control unit connector dust cap 
3. LM- 5 descent stage: 
a. Crew equipment shortages included 10 GFE items and 4 CFE items, 
b. Standard alinement markings for installation of the television camera 
lenses need to be incorporated. 
c. The compatibility between the extravehicular gloves and the knurled 
handles of the television camera and of the lunar surface hammer needs to be examined. 
March 3 to 13, 1969. - The third manned Apollo flight was  conducted. Apollo 9, 
the first manned flight of the LM, qualified the LM fo r  lunar operations. The mission 
consisted of a n  Earth orbit rendezvous and the first  Apollo EVA. It was concluded that 
the concepts and operational functioning of the spacecraft/crew interfaces (including 
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procedures, provisioning, restraints,  and displays and controls) were satisfactory fo r  
manned LM functions. 
the LM, both while docked and undocked. 
The mission also verified the interfaces between the CM and 
The Apollo 9 mission experienced seven crew station anomalies within each ve- 
hicle. The CM problems consisted of four display and control component anomalies, a 
temporarily inoperative docking spotlight, interior floodlight anomalies, and mechani- 
cal difficulties in an  ECS control valve. 
failure, loss of the push-to-talk (PTT) communications mode, unexplained C&W light 
activations, mechanical difficulties with the forward hatch, and excessive cabin noise. 
The LM problems included a tracking light 
March 7 to 10, 1969.- The Apollo 11 prime and baCKUp crews participated in  
LM-5 simulated altitude cnamber tes ts  and CCFF exercises  a t  KSC. Deficiencies/ 
discrepancies that were noted included the following. 
1. Crew equipment shortages included seven GFE items. 
2. The secondary and descent detents of the water tank select  valve would not 
engage. 
3. The CDR's ACA controller box had approximately 5" of mecnanical "play" in  
the pitch axis. 
4. The DSKY table was  difficult to stow and unstow. 
5. Velcro on the kickplate f o r  attaching the left-hand-side stowage container 
was missing. 
6. The LMP's engine-stop pushbutton was hard to operate because of the mechan- 
ical slop in the switch's external positive- actuation device. 
March 7, 11, and 12, 1969. - The Apollo 11 prime and baCKUp crews participated 
in  CSM-107 simulated altitude cnamber tes ts  and CCFF exercises  a t  KSC. Deficiencies/ 
discrepancies that were noted included the following. 
1. Crew equipment shortages included eight GFE i tems and six CFE items. 
2. The mi r ro r  was not mounted on the LMP's coucn head strut .  
3. The locking mechanism on the CDR's COAS mount was sticking in the unlock 
position, 
4. Crewmen could not hear  the mas ter  a larm audio tone. 
5. The scanning telescope eyepiece was loose when attached to the G&N panel. 
6. One of tne lower equipment bay stowage volumes w a s  not f irmly attached in  
the spacecraft. 
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March 18, 24, and27, 1969.- Tne Apollo 11 prime and baCKUp crews participated 
in  tne CSM- 107 altitude ciiamber tes ts  at KSC . Deficiencies/discrepancies that were 
noted during tne tes ts  included the following. 
1. Crew equipment shortages included seven GFE i tems and twxro CFE items. 
2. The CMP's oxygen umbilical would not route properly. 
3. Crewmen could not hear the C&W audio tone. 
4. The spacecraft lanyard for  the docking target connector's dust cap was  too 
short. 
5. The hatch dump valve was binding and was improperly indexed. 
6. All hand controller mounts were loose. 
April 3 and 4, 1969.- The Apollo 11 prime and backup crews participated in 
tlie LM-5 descent stage CCFF test  a t  KSC. Directions to correct  the deficiencies/ 
discrepancies tnat were noted included tne following. 
1. Provide the flightcrew with closeout photographs of the early Apollo scientific 
experiments package (EASEP), the modular equipment stowage assembly (MESA), and 
the S- band antenna as soon as possible after closeout. 
2. Schedule a la te r  flightcrew evaluation of flight- configured i tems not available 
f o r  review. 
3. Provide markings a t  the end of the S-band antenna cable to denote full ex- 
tension. 
April 17, 1969. - The MSC spacecraft/crew integration plan for  manned Block I1 
Apollo CSM and LM missions was revised. Major changes to the plan included the fol- 
lowing. 
1. A flightcrew equipment liaison group replaced the crew equipment engineer 
and was established to  support the FCST in the integration of flightcrew equipment with 
the spacecraft t o  support ASP0 program schedules. 
2. Spacecraft crew station reviews, previously designated as spacecraft crew 
compartment stowage reviews, would be conducted as required on an individually ne- 
gotiated basis instead of being conducted for each specific spacecraft. 
3. The listing of detailed checkout specifications, operational checkout proce- 
dures, and test and checkout procedures requiring flightcrew participation was re- 
defined. The checkout exercises  that were added are given in table 11. 
May 18 to  26, 1969. - The fourth manned Apollo flight was conducted. The Apollo 
10 mission, the first lunar flight of the complete Apollo spacecraft, included a low pass  
over  the lunar surface and the first lunar orbit rendezvous. It was concluded that the 
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TABLE IT. - ADDITIONAL CHECKOUT EXERCISES FOR BLOCK I1 APOLLO CSM 
AND LM MISSIONS 
Checkout exercise Test  location 
i CSM- 107 
7 
Crew equipment stowage 
Integration test 
Bench check 
Combined systems test 
CSM contractor's facility 
KSC 
Combined subsystems test  
Fluids testing 
Combined subsystems test  before full engineer- 
ing and analysis test (FEAT) 
LM combined FEAT 
Descent-stage equipment fit and function test 
CM-LM mechanical docking 
LM contractor's facility 
KSC 
systems in both the LM and the CSM were operational for  manned lunar landings and 
that the crew tasks  associated with LM checkout, initial descent, and rendezvous were 
both feasible and practical  without imposing an unreasonable crew workload. 
The Apollo 10 mission eqeriencec! 12 crew ailomdies, 7 in the CM and 5 in the 
LM. The CM problems included three display and control anomalies, intermittent 
annunciator warnings, couch s t rut  discrepancies, and flaking of the CM hatch thermal 
coating. 
tion, and excessive cabin noise. 
The L M  problems included several  unexplained C&W alarms,  AOT contamina- 
June 5 and 10, 1969.- The Apollo 11 prime crew participated in  an LM-5 descent- 
stage and ascent-stage delta CCFF test at KSC. Deficiencies/discrepancies noted 
during tne review included tne following. 
1. Descent stage: 
a. Crew equipment shortages included three GFE items. 
b. The manufacturer's par t  number label should be removed from the tele- 
vision cable to eliminate a possible stowage interference problem within the MESA. 
2. Ascent stage: 
a. Crew equipment shortages included four GFE i tems and one CFE item. 
b. Several Velcro patches were missing from the spacecraft. 
c. The docking hatch would not latch to the ascent engine cover. 
d. Oxygen umbilicals were very difficult t o  stow and unstow. 
3. Considerable rotation existed between the 70- mill imeter camera and the 
handle. 
June 10, 1969. - The Apollo 11 prime crew participated in a CSM-107 delta 
CCFF exercise a t  KSC. Deficiencies/ discrepancies noted during tile review in- 
cluded the following. 
1. The center crewman's fecal containment subsystem should be deleted. 
2. Rotational controller 2 would not ratchet at the controller/mount interface. 
3. The left-hand-side window shade does not fit properly. 
4. The sextant 16-millimeter magazine should be identified by film type and 
camera  speed and f o r  use with sextant. 
June 18, 1969. - The Apollo 11 prime crew participated in an LM-5 descent- 
stage bencn c h e w  of MESA stowage items. The closeup s tereocamera was  modified 
a t  tne review by removal of one of two Teflon mounting clips and rework of 
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the tabs on the two deployment lanyards to  make them stand out better. Following this 
modification, the flightcrew stated that all equipment was acceptable fo r  flight. 
July 1, 1969. - The stowage locations f o r  the Apollo 11 flight data file subassem- 
blies were defined by the FCST. 
stowed in four separate stowage locations (Rl,  R12, R3, and the PGA pockets). All 
the components in the LM were stowed in the LM flight data file compartment. The 
flight data files were composed of the following documents. 
Components of the CSM-107 flight data file were 
1. CSM-107 flight data file assembly: 
Entry Operation Checklist Operation Checklist 
CMP Solo Book Alternate and Contingency Checklist 
CSM Lunar Landmark Maps CSM Data Card Kit 
Alternate Flight Plan LM Transfer  Data Card Kit 
CSM Malfunction Procedures Earth Orbital Map 
Flight Plan Target of Opportunity Chart  
CSM Updates Launch Operation Checklist 
CSM Systems Data 
2. LM-5 Flight Data File assembly: 
LM Lunar Surface Checklist 
LM Postdocking and Contingency 
LM Malfunction Procedures 
LM Systems Data 
LM Data Card Book 
LM Rendezvous Checklist 
C he cklis t 
LM G&N Dictionary 
July 16, 1969. - By launch, the Apollo 11 prime crew had participated in approxi- 
mately 40 spacecraft and flightcrew equipment reviews at KSC. These reviews were as 
follows: 
Bench check (CM and LM) 
MESA bench check 
Cabin familiarization (CM and LM) 
Egress training for  the altitude 
Simulated altitude chamber tests 
"Mini" CCFF (CM and LM) 
Altitude chamber tests 
Descent stage CCFF 
PTT switch location selection (LM) 
EASEP compartment fit and function 
EASEP bay closeout 
chambers 
Decal selection 
Erectable S- band antenna handle 
inspection 
Delta CCFF LM (ascent stage and 
descent stage) and CM (at pad) 
EMU CCFF, delta EMU CCFF, and 
flight EMU CCFF 
Closeup s tereocamera fit check 
MESA preflight bench check 
Safety walkdown of pad 39A 
MESA closeout 
Flight readiness test (CM and LM) 
Countdown demonstration test 
Preflight bench check (CM and LM) 
July 16 to 24, 1969. - The fifth manned Apollo flight and the first manned lunar 
landing was  accomplished. The Apollo 11 mission accomplished the basic objective of 
the Apollo Program - men were landed on the lunar surface and returned safely to 
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Earth. The Apollo 11 mission experienced three CM and five LM crew station anoma- 
lies. The CM anomalies included the failure of an EL segment in the EMS alphanumeric 
readout, an unexplained mas ter  a larm activation, and an  intermittent ECS control valve. 
The LM anomalies included the failure of an EL segment in the abort guidance system 
(AGS) data entry and dlsphy assembly (DEDA) data register,  computer a la rms  during 
landing, the failure of the mission timer, circuit breaker impact problems, and tran- 
sient indications from the RCS jet failure detection logic. 
MlSSlON EXPERIENCE 
Apollo 7 Mission 
The Apollo 7 mission was the first manned flight of the Apollo Program. In the 
Apollo 7 mission report, it was concluded that all objectives were effectively accom- 
plished and that the mission was successful i n  every respect. Specific conclusions 
drawn relative to  CM crew station design and operations included the following. 
1. The CM was  qualified fo r  operation in the Earth-orbital environment and was  
ready for  flight tests in the cislunar and lunar-orbital environments. 
2. The concepts and operational functioning of the spacecraft/crew interfaces, 
including procedures, provisioning, accommodations, and displays and controls, were 
acceptable. 
3. The capability of performing a CM-active rendezvous, with only optical and 
onboard data, was demonstrated. 
4. Navigation techniques, in general, were demonstrated to be adequate for  
lunar missions. 
The Apollo 7 flightcrew found that the CM crew station was adequately configured 
f o r  the mission and caused no compromise of crew performance of required duties. 
All areas of the cabin proved to  be readily accessible, and most work could be per- 
formed without the use  of restraints.  Donning and doffing pressure  suits was much 
easier  in  a weightless state than in  a one-g environment and createdno problemfor tne 
crew. Stowage techniques and procedures were considered to be good. The displays 
and controls and the lighting proved satisfactory except fo r  a periodic problem with 
sunglare on the instrument panel. Visibility through the spacecraft window ranged f rom 
good to  poor because of a contamination problem caused by window sealant compound 
outgassing, 
Six crew station anomalies occurred on the Apollo 7 mission: four relative to 
displays and controls, one relative to lighting, and the visibility problem previously 
mentioned. Display and control anomalies included (1) a sudden 160" shift in the pitch 
axis of the attitude indicator when the attitude source was switched from G&N to the 
SCS, (2) the temporary failure of a rotational hand controller (RHC) to generate mini- 
mum impulse commands, (3) the failure of the delta-V and range-counter circuits of the 
EMS, and (4) the cracking of the window glass of both mission t imers.  The secondary 
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lamps of the floodlights in the LEB failed during the mission, and window visibility was 
reduced because of a buildup of film on the glass surface. 
Anomalies that occurred on the Apollo missions were generally resolved by using 
one (and sometimes a combination) of the following four methods: (1) no change because 
of randomness and low criticality of failure, (2) additional hardware testing o r  screen- 
ing, (3) hardware modification, o r  (4) procedural change (in onboard and/or ground 
operations) 
For the Apollo 7 mission, the attitude indicator and RHC anomalies were resolved 
by method 1, the EMS anomaly by method 2, the mission t imer  problem by method 3 
(transparent tape was placed over glass windows of subsequent indicators), the flood- 
light problem by methods 2 and 4 (in subsequent vehicles, only the secondary lamp 
would be used on "full bright" during ground tests), and the window visibility problem 
by method 4 (room-temperature-vulcanized (RTV) material  used in window areas on 
the Apollo 9 and subsequent spacecraft would be precured in a vacuum a t  elevated tem- 
peratures  instead of being room cured). 
Apollo 8 Mission 
The Apollo 8 mission was the second manned flight of the Apollo Program and 
the first manned lunar-orbital mission. 
uted significantly to the development of a lunar- landing capability. Specific conclusions 
drawn relative to CM crew station design and operations included the following. 
The success  of the Apollo 8 mission contrib- 
1, The CSM systems were operational for  manned lunar flight. 
2. The navigation techniques developed f o r  translunar and lunar- orbital flight 
were more than adequate. 
3. Nonsimultaneous sleep periods adversely affected the normal circadian cycle 
of each crewmember and provided a poor environment for  undisturbed rest. 
Relatively few problems were encountered in regard to crew station design and 
operations. Equipment stowage, displays and controls, and lighting were found to  be 
adequate. A modified kitchen t imer,  carr ied at the suggestion of the Apollo 7 crew, 
proved very useful for  timing routine crew station operations, such as fuel cell purges. 
Glare shields that had been placed over certain displays to eliminate the Sun-shaft 
problem encountered during the Apollo 7 mission proved ineffective. Supplemental- 
information decals installed on the instrument panels before the flight proved very 
helpful to the crew. The CM windows became contaminated ear ly  in the flight, as 
was expected, because the design f i x  f o r  this  problem (earlier encountered on the 
Apollo 7 mission) could not be made effective until the Apollo 9 mission because Of 
schedule constraints . 
Three crew station anomalies were experienced during the Apollo 8 mission. 
One anomaly concerned abnormal indications f rom the delta-V and scrol l  (g/velocity 
trace) of the EMS at different t imes  during the mission. A second anomaly concerned 
disconcerting noise from the cabin fans. The third crew station anomaly was the win- 
dow problem previously mentioned. The EMS anomaly was resolved by method 1 
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(previously defined in the Apollo 7 mission discussion) and the cabin fan anomaly by 
method 4. (Cabin fans would be deenergized during general  crew station operations on 
subsequent missions. ) The disposition of the window anomaly was discussed in the 
previous section. 
Apollo 9 Mission 
The Apollo 9 mission was the first manned flight of the LM and was performed to  
qualify this  portion of the Apollo spacecraft for lunar operations, Specific conclusions 
relative to CM and LM crew station design and operations included the following. 
1. The onboard rendezvous equipment and techniques of both spacecraft provided 
the precision required fo r  the lunar- landing missions. 
2. The functional operation of the docking process  was demonstrated as was the 
criticality of proper lighting conditions for docking. 
3. The practicality of extravehicular crew transfer  in the event of a contingency 
was demonstrated. 
4. The concepts and operational functioning of the spacecraft/crew interfaces 
(including procedures, provisioning, restraints, and displays and controls) were satis- 
factory fo r  manned LM functions. The interfaces between the two spacecraft, both 
while docked and undocked, were also verified as being satisfactory. 
Seven CM crew station anomalies occurred during the Apollo 9 mission. The 
increase over the number involved in previous missions was caused by additional mis- 
sion complexities and the interfaces associated with two- vehicle operation. The anom- 
alies consisted of (1) erroneous indications of the docking status indicator during sepa- 
ration and docking; (2) EMS failure to scribe during entry; (3) unexplainable a l a rms  
f rom the propellant utilization and gaging system (PUGS), which indicated an  excessive 
propellant imbalance; (4) unexplainable activation of the mas ter  alarm, without C&W 
activation, coincident with docking; (5) inoperativeness of the docking spotlight (mounted 
on the SM) before rendezvous; (6) floodlight failures and odors; and (7) difficulties 'ln 
operating the CM surge tank shutoff valve. 
I 
The docking indication anomaly was resolved by method 4 (as defined in the dis- 
cussion of the Apollo 7 mission). Docking procedures were changed to specify holding 
of the extend/release position until physical separation. The EMS anomaly was re- 
solved by methods 2 and 3; the PUGS alarm anomaly by methods 3 and 4 (the C&W input 
to  the mas ter  a la rm was disconnected, and a new ground procedure was established for  
adjustment of PUGS instrumentation sensors); the mas ter  a la rm anomaly by method 1; 
the docking light anomaly by method 4 (the light was inoperative because of a failure to  
include in the checklist the activation of the docking-light circuit  breaker before spot- 
light deployment); the floodlight anomalies by methods 1 and 4 (the floodlights would be 
operated in the full-bright configuration to reduce cathode erosion and in  a single-lamp 
mode to  eliminate any burn threat to the crew); and the surge tank valve anomaly by 
method 4 (the problem, caused by misalinement of the valve detent position markings, 
was resolved by closer inspection of subsequent vehicles). 
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Seven crew station anomalies were also experienced with the LM flown on the 
Apollo 9 mission. These anomalies consisted of (1) a tracking light failure shortly 
after LM staging, (2) failure of the LMP's PTT communications mode toward the end 
of the mission, (3) a C&W alarm during AGS activation, (4) binding of the forward hatch 
when opened for  EVA, (5) failure of the forward hatch to remain open for  EVA, ( 6 )  ex- 
cessive noise in the LM, and (7) unexplainable illumination of the "operator e r ro r "  
light upon actuation of the DEDA "clear" pushbutton. 
The tracking light anomaly was resolved by methods 2 and 3; the PTT communi- 
cation problem by methods 1 and 4 (additional troubleshooting procedures were devel- 
oped); the AGS C&W anomaly by method 1; the hatch anomalies by method 3 (dimensions 
and clearances were modified, and a door snubber was added); the noise problem by 
methods 2, 3, and 4 (subsequent noise measurements in another LM vehicle illustrated 
the need to reduce the overall noise level in the cabin; this reduction was enabled by 
operating only one cabin fan when cooling was required and by providing earplugs fo r  
the crewmen); and the DEDA light anomaly by method 3. On the Apollo 11 spacecraft 
(and all subsequent Apollo spacecraft), all DEDA mode pushbuttons were modified by 
connecting the output of redundant switches within the pushbuttons so  that closure of 
either switch could initiate a necessary function. 
Apollo 10 Mission 
The Apollo 10 mission was the first lunar flight of the complete Apollo spacecraft. 
The purpose of the mission was to  confirm all aspects of the lunar-landing mission, 
exactly as it would be performed, except for  the actual descent, landing, lunar stay, 
and ascent f rom the lunar surface. Specific conclusions drawn relative to CM and LM 
crew station design and operations included the following. 
1. The systems in both the LM and the CSM were operational for  a manned lunar 
landing. 
2. Crew tasks associated with LM checkout, initial descent, and rendezvous 
were both feasible and practical  and did not constitute an unreasonable crew workload. 
During the Apollo 10 mission, fewer crew station anomalies occurred (seven for  
the CM and five for  the LM) than during the Apollo 9 mission. Except fo r  a problem 
with cabin noise, none of the anomalies were repeats of the Apollo 9 experiences; in 
fact, all were associated with different equipment or  circuits. 
The CM anomalies were (1) minor oscillations of the crewman's couch occurred 
during launch because of the improper configurations of the couch stabilizer, (2) the 
GDC exhibited excessive drift in the roll  and yaw axes, (3) the EMS scribe function 
(acceleration/velocity) was intermittent before entry, (4) flaking of the CM hatch ther- 
mal coating occurred when the LM was first pressurized, (5) redundant lamps in  the 
launch vehicle engine warning annunciators were intermittent during prelaunch lamp 
tests, ( 6 )  the digital event t imer  gained and lost t ime during certain mission phases, 
and (7) the left-hand head- s t ru t  lockout handle was found to be in the locked position 
during postflight inspection. 
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The CM couch stabil izer anomaly was resolved by method 4 (mandatory inspec- 
tion of the stabil izer configuration would be required as par t  of the preingress  inspec- 
tion on subsequent missions), the GDC anomaly by method 2, the EMS scribe anomaly 
by method 3 (a new type of scrol l  emulsion was used on later missions), the hatch coat- 
ing anomaly by method 3 (hatch insulation w a s  replaced with a single layer  of H-film 
tape), and the launch vehicle annunciator and event t imer  anomalies by method 2. The 
head- s t rut  discrepancy found during the postflight inspection was  resolved by method 4 
(the lever spring of the strut 's  lockout handle was found to have insufficient force to 
prevent the hood from returning to the locked position; a mandatory inspection point 
was subsequently added to the manufacturing process to  ensure proper assembly and 
operation). 
The LM anomalies included (1) a gimbal drive actuator (GDA) failure indication 
during the CM-LM phasing maneuver, (2) the occurrence of three master  a l a rms  dur- 
ing the same maneuver, (3) AOT problems (hairlike objects on the reticle and loss  of 
the peripheral  portion of the AOT field of view), (4) excessive noise in the cabin, and 
(5) ascent propulsion warning light illumination with first ascent engine firing. 
The LM GDA failure indication was resolved by method 3 (the brake mechanism 
and instrumentation logic were redesigned on later vehicles to prevent false failure 
indications caused by transient gimbal movements), the mas ter  a larm anomalies by 
method 3 (the descent propellant low-quantity signal t o  the C&W system was disabled 
to prevent nuisance triggering), the AOT anomalies by methods 1 and 4 (the pr i sm and 
reticle of later AOT's received additional cleaning and inspection to  prevent contamina- 
tion), and the noise problem by method 4 (earplugs would be available for  optional crew 
use  during sleep periods on future missions). The ascent propulsion warning light 
anomaly was resolved by methods 1 and 4. The probable cause of the indication was 
considered to be the uncovering of a low-level propellant sensor  by a gas  bubble formed 
as a resul t  of the low (5G percent) propellant load and ullage required for  tne particular 
mission. Larger  fuel loads, longer ullages, and the existence of a 1/6-g lunar environ- 
ment prevented a repeat of this anomaly on later flignts. 
Apollo 11 Mission 
The Apollo 11 mission resulted in the accomplishment of the basic objective of 
the Apollo Program: men were landed on the lunar surface and returned safely to Earth. 
Specific conclusions drawn about CM and LM crew station design and operations included 
the following. 
1. Manual control in maneuvering the LM to the desired landing point was satis- 
factorily exercised. 
2. Lunar surface prelaunch operations were well planned and executed. 
3. The time-line activities for  all phases of the lunar-landing mission were well 
within the crew's capability to  perform the required tasks. 
4. The hardware problems experienced on the mission, as on previous manned 
missions, did not unduly hamper the crew or  result in the compromise of safety o r  mis- 
sion objectives. 
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During the Apollo 11 mission, three CM crew station anomalies and five LM crew 
station anomalies were experienced. Except for a problem with the LM mission t imer,  
none of the anomalies had been experienced on earlier Apollo flights. 
The CM anomalies included (1) a one-digit loss  in the EL segment of the EMS 
velocity indicator, (2) the occurrence of master a larm activation during LM pressuri-  
zation, and (3) intermittent glycol temperature control valve authority. The EMS and 
mas ter  a larm anomalies were resolved by method 1 (a generic problem was considered 
unlikely after considering the total hardware experience), and the glycol temperature 
control problem was resolved by method 2 (a detailed inspection was made of valves 
installed on subsequent vehicles). 
The LM anomalies included (1) an inoperative mission t imer  shortly af ter  lunar 
landing, (2) the occurrence of several  guidance computer program a la rms  during lunar 
landing, (3) a one-digit loss  in the EL segment of the data regis ter  fo r  the AGS DEDA, 
(4) the breaking of a circuit breaker  knob and the inadvertent closing of two other cir- 
cuit breakers  during lunar stay, and (5) RCS thrust  chamber assembly flags indicating 
sporadic malfunctions of the jet fir ing logic. 
The LM mission t imer  anomaly was resolved by method 3 (new timers,  of a dif- 
ferent source and design, were procured). The computer program a la rm anomaly was 
due to noncritical interrupts of the computer's executive program caused by peakload 
processing of rendezvous radar (RR) data; this anomaly was handled by method 3. (The 
computer software of subsequent LM's was modified to  ignore counterinterrupts from 
the RR coupling data units. ) The DEDA EL anomaly was resolved by method 1, the cir-  
cuit breaker problem by method 3 (additional guards were installed to  prevent the oxy- 
gen purge system - the top portion of the PLSS - from impacting the circuit  breakers), 
and the RCS flag anomaly by method 1. 
In summary, 43 crew station anomalies were experienced on the first five manned 
Apollo missions. This number was approximately one-third of the total anomalies re- 
ported. Except for  problems with the EMS, the event and mission t imers ,  and the crew 
station noise, the crew station anomalies were unique and nongeneric. Fourteen of the 
anomalies were resolved by method 1 (no change required because of randomness and 
low criticality of failure), 9 by method 2 (additional hardware testing or  screening), 1 2  
by method 3 (hardware modification), and 8 by method 4 (procedural changes). Prob- 
lems with the EMS occurred on each Apollo mission; the problems were nongeneric, 
however, and therefore received a variety of corrective actions. Problems with the 
Apollo mission t imers  and the LM event timer were eventually resolved by procuring 
redesigned t imers .  The noise problem was resolved by powering down certain equip- 
ment and by using earplugs during certain mission phases. 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The Apollo crew station design and development was  not a radical departure from 
that of previous aerospace programs. However, certain state- of- the- art equipment and 
techniques that will be of use in future programs were developed. The task of Apollo 
crew station design and development w a s  complicated by the number and complexity of 
physical and operational interfaces that existed. 
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The success  of the Apollo crew station effort was attributable to  four basic fac- 
tors:  (1) the use of knowledge gained from prior  aerospace experience and practices;  
(2) the study, review, and simulation of new state- of- the- art designs and operations; 
(3) the ability to control the numerous physical and operational interfaces that existed 
and (4) the effective communications and information dissemination between program 
organizational elements. 
The tools, techniques, and requirements used fo r  Apollo crew station design and 
development were state- of - the- art devices, procedures, and requisites that are gen- 
erally suited fo r  use in follow- on programs. Consequently, crew station specification 
documents pertaining to displays and controls; markings, labeling, and color; environ- 
mental cri teria;  lighting; extravehicular and intervehicular activity support equipment; 
location coding; and loose equipment and stowage have been generated at the NASA 
Lyndon B, Johnson Space Center (formerly the Manned Spacecraft Center). These 
specifications will se rve  as a medium for transferring Apollo (and earlier) crew sta- 
tion experience to  subsequent programs. 
As a resul t  of the Apollo experience, three areas were identified that will require  
special attention in future crew station development efforts. Recurrent problems ex- 
isted with crew station acoustics, instrument glass (breakage), and caution and warning 
systems. F o r  the benefit of post- Apollo design efforts, specifications and standards 
have been published that are intended to circumvent problems in these areas. Recom- 
mended engineering approaches t o  these three potential problem areas are as follows. 
1. Crew station acoustics: An integrated approach toward noise reduction is re- 
quired, including the early application of MSC Design and Procedural Standard 145, 
"Acoustic Noise Criteria,  t f  and the c r i te r ia  contained in  other Lyndon B. Johnson 
Space Center and military standards. 
2. Instrument glass:  Applicationof MSC Design and Procedural Standards 41 and 
144, "Snatterable Material - Exclusionfrom Crew Compartment" and ''Windows and Glass 
Structure, '' should ensure the proper selection and testing of all crew station glass  and 
thus circumvent the type of instrument glass  failures experienced on Apollo missions. 
3. Caution and warning systems: Designs that conform to the functional require- 
ments containedin MSC Specification SC-D-0007, "Displays, Manned Spacecraft and 
Related Fligntcrew Equipment, Functional Design Requirements for," should negate many 
of the problems experiencedwitn the Apollo caution and warning systems. Design features  
that would help reduce nuisance triggering include (1) conversion to  an  "all digital" sys- 
tem, (2) ease of access  for  recalibration of caution and warning signal levels and modi- 
fication of transient control circuitry, and (3) provision of crew inhibits for  each cau- 
tion and warning channel. 
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